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Canadian Monopolies Law: Director of
Investigation and Research v. NutraSweet
Co. Decided as First Case Under
Abuse-of-Dominance Provision
Introduction
When Canada passed the Competition Act' in 1986, the Act's novel
anti-monopoly provision promised an innovative and distinctly Cana-
dian approach to monopoly control. Director of Investigation and Research
v. NutraSweet Co.,2 the first case decided under the new "abuse-of-domi-
nance" provision section 79 of the Act, was a pivotal decision for the
fate of the new competition law. The case involved alleged anticompeti-
tive practices by the NutraSweet Company (NSC) after its Canadian
aspartame patent expired in 1987. In the absence of Canadian prece-
dent, the Competition Tribunal deciding the case looked to American
and European Community (EC) monopolization case law for guidance.
In its reliance on the substantive law, however, the Tribunal also
adopted the analytical framework used in the United States and the EC
and effectively replaced the new section with a mechanism substantially
identical to that existing in the United States and the EC.
Section I of this Note Will describe the Canadian, American, and
European statutes that address abuses of market power. Section II of
the Note will compare the rationale of the Canadian Tribunal in Nutra-
Sweet with the rationale that would have been used in American and
European jurisdictions. Section III will illustrate how the Tribunal's
reliance on U.S. and EC substantive law led Canada to adopt an analyti-
cal framework similar to the one that exists in America and the EC and
consequently to transform the Canadian provision.
I. Background
Section A will describe the Canadian statutory scheme regarding abuses
of market position and the correlative anti-monopoly provisions in the
United States and in the European Community. Section B will provide
the background of the NutraSweet case. Section C will explore the pre-
dictions of commentators who believed that Canadian courts would use
1. R.S.C., ch. C-34 (1985) (Can.), as amended.
2. No. CT-89/2 (Comp. Trib. Oct. 4, 1990).
25 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 437 (1982)
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U.S. and EC substantive law to decide the case. Finally, Section D will
conclude that these predictions were fulfilled.
A. Competition Law in Canada, the United States and the European
Community
1. Canada's Competition Act
On June 19, 1986, after twenty years of attempted antitrust law reform,
the Canadian government enacted the Competition Act. The Act
culminated a two-stage revision of the older Combines Investigation
Act,5 the first stage of which was implemented in 1976. In addition to
changing the name of the previous legislation, the new Competition Act
(1) replaced the criminal prohibition of monopolies with a civil proceed-
ing, addressing anticompetitive practices of firms "abusing" their "dom-
inant position," and (2) replaced the Restrictive Trade Practice
Commission with a newly created Competition Tribunal, which has
jurisdiction over anticompetitive practices involving abuse of
dominance. 4
Commentators had long considered Canadian monopoly law to be
ineffective and obsolete.5 Although the criminal prohibition against
monopolies had existed since 1910, it had produced merely fifteen pros-
ecutions6 and one conviction. 7
Several problems with the old Act, particularly its criminal nature,
were evident. First, the criminal burden of proof, "beyond a reasonable
doubt," was too onerous for the Crown, given the nature of the conduct
prohibited by the provision.8 Second, "the behavior being censured did
not have the moral taint necessary to be considered criminal, so judges
would not convict." Third, "[j]udges, not being economists and having
very little familiarity with the issues, did not have the tools to creatively
deal with the law." 10 Fourth, "It]he law was not sufficiently certain to
guide the behavior of businessmen and the decisions of the judges."'
3. Ch. 9, 1910 S.C. 131 (Can.).
4. GORDON KAISER, COMPETITION LAW OF CANADA § 1.01[7], at 21-23 (1989).
5. Id. § 14.02, at 5.
6. W. T. Stanbury, The New Competition Act and Competition Tribunal Act: "Not With
a Bang, But a Whimper," 12 CAN. Bus. L.J. 2, 29 (1986-87).
7. Eddy Match Co. v. Queen (1954) 18 C.R. 357; 109 C.C.C. 1; 20 C.P.R. 107
(Que. C.A.). The conviction was of little instructive value, as it involved an obvious
abuse of monopoly power. KAISER, supra note 4, § 9.01, at 3.
8. The civil law standard of proof is "on a balance of probabilities." Lawson A.
W. Hunter & John F. Blakney, The Changing Canadian Competition Law Environment:
Implications for International Business, 1 REv. INT'L Bus. L. 235, 238 (1987).
9. Roger L. Martin & Brad Martin, Abuse of Dominance or Abuse of Reason?, 8 CAN.
COMPETITON POL'Y. REC. 61, 61 (1987) (noting that the OLA Act, the legislative pro-
hibition on monopolies with "detrimental characteristics" was so vague that the
courts gave it a highly restrictive interpretation, accepting "only the most obvious
and severe abuses of power" and "only when proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
See also J. BRUCE DUNLOP ET AL., CANADIAN COMPETrION POLICY: A LEGAL AND Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS 191 (1987).
10. Martin & Martin, supra note 9, at 61.
11. Id.
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Fifth, the methods used to acquire and retain a market concentration,
not the existence of the concentration itself, should have been the focus
of the inquiry, as concentrations may in fact be beneficial. 12 Sixth, the
statute did not exempt conduct that appeared to lessen competition but
really effected superior competitive performance.' 3
Section 79 of the Competition Act prohibits "abuse of a dominant
position,"' 14 forbidding the practice of "anticompetitive acts" by those
in "substantial" or "complete" control of a "class of species of busi-
ness" if such acts lessen competition "substantially." Claims under sec-
12. KAiSER, supra note 4, § 9.01, at 3. See also R. D. Anderson & S. D. Khosla,
Reflections on McDonald on Abuse of Dominant Position, 8 CAN. COMPETrIION POL'Y. REc.
51, 56-57 (1987) (noting that the acts listed in section 78 are not illegal unless they
cause competition to be lessened substantially as required by section 79(1)(c), a
requirement "consistent with modem antitrust thought which emphasizes that [such]
practices ... may be anti-competitive, pro-competitive or even competitively neutral
depending on the circumstances.").
13. KAISER, supra note 4, § 9.01, at 3. See also DUNLOP ET At., supra note 9, at 191.
14. 79. (1) Where, on application by the Director, the Tribunal finds that
(a) one or more persons substantially or completely control, .throughout
Canada or any area thereof, a class or species of business,
(b) that person or those persons have engaged in or are engaging in a
practice of anti-competitive acts, and
(c) the practice has had, is having or is likely to have the effect of prevent-
ing or lessening competition substantially in a market,
the Tribunal may make an order prohibiting all or any of those persons
from engaging in that practice.
Competition Act § 79, as amended. Nine specific "anti-competitive acts," mentioned
in section 79(l)(b), are enumerated in section 78:
78. For the purposes of section 79, "anti-competitive act," without
restricting the generality of the term, includes any of the following acts:
(a) squeezing, by a vertically integrated supplier, of the margin available to
an unintegrated customer who competes with the supplier, for the purpose of
impeding or preventing the customer's entry into, or expansion in, a market;
(b) acquisition by a supplier of a customer who would otherwise be avail-
able to a competitor of the supplier, or acquisition by a customer of a sup-
plier who would otherwise be available to a competitor of the customer, for
the purpose of impeding or preventing the competitor's entry into, or elimi-
nating the competitor from, a market;
(c) freight equalization on the plant of a competitor for the purpose of
impeding or preventing the competitor's entry into, or eliminating the com-
petitor from, a market;
(d) use of fighting brands introduced selectively on a temporary basis to
discipline or eliminate a competitor;
(e) pre-emption of scarce facilities or resources required by a competitor
for the operation of a business, with the object of withholding the facilities or
resources from a market;
(f) buying up of products to prevent the erosion of existing price levels;
(g) adoption of product specifications that are incompatible with products
produced by any other person and are designed to prevent his entry into, or
to eliminate him from, a market;
(h) requiring or inducing a supplier to sell only or primarily to certain cus-
tomers, or to refrain from selling to a competitor, with the object of prevent-
ing a competitor's entry into, or expansion in, a market; and
(i) selling articles at a price lower than the acquisition cost for the purpose
of disciplining or eliminating a competitor.
Id. § 78.
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tion 79 arise under the jurisdiction of the Competition Tribunal, newly
established by the Act, which is also seized of non-criminal matters of
competition.' 5 Members of the Tribunal are culled from both lay and
judicial ranks in an attempt to provide both economic and legal exper-
tise.1 6 The Tribunal adjudicates only, unlike the Federal Trade Com-
mission in the U.S., which also promulgates regulations. The Director
of Investigation and Research undertakes investigative functions.'
7
Only the Director may make applications to the Tribunal regarding
potential violations of section 79.18 Third parties must ask the Director
to make an application on their behalf. Parties having legitimate inter-
ests in matters being heard can intervene once the Director has submit-
ted an application.19
2. The United States and the European Community
a. The United States
The Sherman Act is a criminal statute providing that "every person who
shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several states or with foreign nations shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor." 20 It is, however," 'well settled' that section 2 does not
prohibit monopoly simpliciter--or, as the Supreme Court phrased it in
the early landmark case of Standard Oil 'monopoly in the concrete.' "$21
The offense of "monopolization" has two elements: (1) "posses-
sion of monopoly power in the relevant market," and (2) "acquisition or
maintenance of that power" by means other than "superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident."'2 2 Unlawfully acquired monop-
oly power always violates section 2, even when "the power has not been
15. KAiSER, supra note 4, § 3.06[5], at 72.
16. Id. at 71. The legislation provides that the Tribunal will consist of up to four
judges of the Federal Court Trial Division and up to eight lay specialists. Appoint-
ments are for up to seven-year terms, and both lay and judicial members may be re-
appointed. Panels of three to five members hear applications, and they must include
at least one lay and one judicial member. Judicial members alone must decide all
questions of pure law. Id. at 71-72.
17. Id. at 71. To some extent, the Tribunal is modelled after the Swedish Market
Court and the U.K. Restrictive Practices Court. Id.
18. Id. at 72.
19. Id. at 72-73.
20. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). The Sherman Act is unlike its Cana-
dian and European Community counterparts in that it contains no illustrations of
violative conduct. "In passing the Sherman Act, Congress recognized that it could
not enumerate all the activities that would constitute monopolization. Section 2,
therefore, in effect conferred upon the federal courts 'a new jurisdiction to apply a
"common law" against monopolizing.'" Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
603 F.2d 263, 272 (2nd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (quoting 3 PHiL-
LIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 40 (1978)).
21. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 273 (citation omitted) (quoting Standard Oil Co. of
N.J. v. United States, 222 U.S. 1, 62 (1911)).
22. United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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used to extract improper benefits."' 23 Legitimately acquired monopoly
power only violates the statute when used to "maintain" or to "extend"
market control. 24
b. The European Community
The European equivalent of section 2 of the Sherman Act is Article 86 of
the Treaty of Rome, which reads in part: "Any abuse by one or more
undertakings of a dominant position within the Common Market or in a
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Com-
mon Market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States." 25
An Article 86 violation requires: (1) that the undertaking involved
possesses a dominant market position; (2) that the undertaking has
abused that position; and (3) that the abuse affects trade between Mem-
ber States. 26 In Hoffmann-La Roche, the Court ofJustice of the European
Communities gave this Article its fullest explication. The Court
explained that the purpose of Article 86 is to ensure that the Community
may achieve its "general objective," that competition in the Common
Market not be distorted.2 7 A "dominant position" is a "position of eco-
23. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 274.
24. Id. In Berkey Photo, Judge Kaufman attempted to wade through some of the
contradictions in American monopoly law. He noted, for reasons of fairness and the
maintenance of economic incentives, that section 2 does not reach those who have
gained monopoly power by purely competitive means, but only those who "exercise"
their monopoly power. Id. At the same time, "exercising" one's monopoly power by
setting a high price is not anticompetitive because "there is no better way for [a firm]
to guarantee that its dominance will be challenged than by greedily extracting the
highest price it can." Id. at 294.
25. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY],
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, art. 86. The Article continues:
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice
of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other par-
ties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to com-
mercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Id. The Court ofJustice has confirmed that the list of abuses contained in Article 86
(a) to (d) is not an exhaustive enumeration of possible abuses. See, e.g., Case 6/72,
Europemballage v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 245, 1973 C.M.L.R. 199, 224.
26. EEC TREATY, supra note 25, art. 86. Yet "if the occupier of a dominant posi-
tion, established in the Common Market, aims at eliminating a competitor who is also
established in the Common Market, it is immaterial whether this behavior relates to
trade between Member States once it has been shown that such elimination will have
repercussions on the patterns of competition in the Common Market." Case 27/76,
United Brands Co. v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, [1978] 1 C.M.L R. 429, 497.
27. Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 520,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211, 274-75.
Article 86 is an application of the general objective of the activities of the
Community laid down by Article 3(f) of the Treaty, namely, the institution of
a system ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not dis-
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nomic strength" that enables a firm "to behave independently of com-
petitors, customers and consumers."'28 A firm in a dominant position
may take reasonable steps necessary to protect its commercial interests
but cannot strengthen or abuse its dominant position.2 9
B. The Beginnings of the New Canadian Case Law: Director of
Investigation and Research v. NutraSweet Co.
On June 1, 1989, Canada's Director of Investigation and Research filed
notice pursuant to the Competition Act, under section 79, prohibiting
abuse of a dominant position, and under section 77, prohibiting exclu-
sive dealing and tied selling. The Director requested that the Tribunal
stop anticompetitive practices of NutraSweet Company and issue orders
necessary to overcome the adverse market effects caused by those prac-
tices.30 The Director's application to the Tribunal was the first civil case
on "abuse of a dominant position" in Canadian history because it was
the first application made under the new competition law provision of
section 79.31
NSC produces aspartame, an artificial sweetener used primarily in
diet soft drinks, chewing gum, low-calorie foods and table-top sweeten-
ers.3 2 NSC sells approximately ninety-five percent of the aspartame in
Canada; Canadian sales represent about five percent of aspartame sales
worldwide.33 As a comparison, in 1989, seventy-five percent of the
aspartame sold in the world was sold in the U.S., where NSC, because of
its use patent, had a one hundred percent share; fifteen percent was sold
in Europe where NSC had an eighty percent share.3 4 Although NSC's
Canadian use patent expired in July 1987, the life of its U.S. patent has
been extended until December 1992.35
The Tribunal examined the Director's principal allegations under
torted .... The dominant position thus referred to relates to a position of
economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent
effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it
the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competi-
tors, its customers and ultimately of the consumers.
Id.
28. Id.
29. United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. at 293, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 496. See also Case T-
51/89, Tetra Pal. Rausing SA v. Commission, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 334, 361 (A.G.
Opinion).
30. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 5.
31. Written Argument of the Applicant, Director of Investigation and Research,
Public Version at 2, Director of Investigation and Research v. NutraSweet Co., No.
CT-89/2 (Comp. Trib. Oct. 4, 1990) [hereinafter Written Argument of the
Applicant].
32. Id. at 6. NSC Canada is a branch of NSC, a U.S. company that is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Monsanto Co. Id.
33. Id. at 7.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 6-7. The Director's investigation was initiated by a complaint made by
Tosoh Canada ("Tosoh"), a corporation responsible for marketing efforts to sell in
Canada aspartame manufactured by NSC's only rival in Europe and Canada, the Hol-
land Sweetener Company (HSC), a joint venture between Naamloze Vennootschap
Vol 25
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"two broad heads." 3 6 First, the Tribunal reviewed contract terms
alleged to create an exclusive-supply relationship between NSC and its
customers. The Director argued that the terms restricted the entry of
would-be or existing competitors. The Tribunal analyzed the issue both
under section 77, "which specifically addresses exclusive dealing and
tied selling,"3 7 and under section 79, which more generally addresses
"anti-competitive acts" undertaken by a firm in a dominant position.3 8
Second, the Tribunal examined the allegation that NSC was selling
below "acquisition cost," an anticompetitive act specifically mentioned
in section 78(i), but with distinct elements.3 9
The Director used European and American case law to support his
case against NutraSweet, and sought to convince the Tribunal to do the
same. At the outset of his argument on the merits, the Director pointed
to the dearth of Canadian precedent and stated:
[T]he European Community ... and the United States ... have both
enacted legislation which limits the acceptable behavior of a dominant
firm in a defined market. Although the wording of Article 86 of the
Treaty of Rome and section 2 of the Sherman Act differ substantially from
section 79 of the Act, they deal with similar problems in a similar com-
mercial context and in light of similar legal concepts. Consequently ....
that cases decided by courts in the United States and the European Com-
munity are helpful and should be persuasive to the Tribunal.40
Prior to NutraSweet, many commentators maintained that European
and American case law would be persuasive before the Tribunal because
the monopoly provisions in the new act seemed to have their genesis in
the laws of the United States and the EC.4 1 For instance, the "abuse of a
DSM and Tosoh Corporation ofJapan. Id. at 9-10. Tosoh started marketing opera-
tions in Canada as soon as NSC's Canadian use patent expired in 1987. Id. at 9.
36. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 10.
37. Id. at 11.
38. The Director contended that exclusive-supply devices, though not listed in
the "non-exhaustive" list of anticompetitive acts in § 78, fell within the "general cri-
teria" for such acts in that section." Id.
39. Id. "It virtually constitutes a separate case with regard to the elements that
must be satisfied." See Competition Act, § 78(i).
40. Written Argument of the Applicant, supra note 31, at 2.
41. Warren Grover & Robert Kwinter, The New Competition Act, 66 CAN. B. REV.
267, 268 (1987); Hunter & Blakney, supra note 8, at 238. "It should also be noted
that although American jurisprudence will no doubt be scrutinized very carefully by
the Director and by the Competition Tribunal in thinking through the issues arising
from the application of sections [78] and [79], the sections are narrower in scope
than section 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 2 of the Sherman Act deals with "monopoli-
zation," which is roughly comparable to Canada's abuse provisions, but it also deals
with attempts to monopolize and with combinations or conspiracy to monopolize.
Attempts to monopolize involve attempts to obtain monopoly power, which is to say
sufficient power to control prices or to exclude competition. Under the new Cana-
dian provisions this type of significant market power is a precondition to the applica-
tion of section [79]." Bruce C. McDonald, Abuse of Dominant Position, 8 CAN.
COMPET IrON POL'Y. REc. 59, 60 (1987).
, The Director's use of American and European law fulfilled the prophecy of Warren
Grover:
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dominant position" provision echoes the wording of Article 86 of the
Treaty of Rome; the anticompetitive acts listed in section 78 seem to
have been culled from American and Canadian case law. 4 2 Section 79
filled a vacuum in Canadian monopoly law. Consequently, it is not sur-
prising that the Director persuaded the Tribunal in NutraSweet to rely on
U.S. and EC case law in interpreting section 79, thus filling a vacuum in
Canadian monopoly jurisprudence.43
By utilizing U.S. and EC law to such a great extent, however, the
Tribunal altered both the essential shape of Canada's "abuse of domi-
nance" provision and the future course of case law decided under that
provision. The Tribunal deemphasized the plain language of the unique
Canadian provision, and thereby created a provision with workings and
results mirroring the Sherman Act and Article 86. The Tribunal not
only used the substantive holdings of American and European case law,
but also adopted their analytical framework in toto, implicitly altering the
provision to conform to American and European models. Section 79, its
original framework having been discarded, now stands as a clone of its
EC and U.S. predecessors.
H. Analysis of the Substantive Law
Section II of this Note will examine the Tribunal's substantive analysis
of the "abuse of dominance" provisions that NSC allegedly violated and
the analytical framework it employed in its decision. This Section will
investigate the Tribunal's motives, authority, and reasoning in (1) defin-
ing the product market, (2) defining the geographic market, (3) deter-
mining whether NSC possessed "control" over the markets, (4)
The history of Canadian antitrust has been to borrow most ideas from the
United States, and I am sure we will find much reference to U.S. source docu-
ments in submissions made to the Bureau of Competition Policy, although
probably without attribution. It is interesting to note how far advanced the
European Community is in this regard, as Canada likes to think that it has a
European perspective as well as a North American one.
Warren Grover, Canadian Antitrust Aspects of Competing in Foreign Markets, 14 CAN.-U.S.
L.J. 93, 104 (1988).
42. Grover & Kwinter, supra note 41, at 287-88. However, while provisions of
U.S. and Canadian antitrust law show a "tremendous convergence," David G. Gill,
U.S. and Canadian Antitrust Aspects of Competing in Foreign Markets, 14 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 105,
106 (1988), this convergence may not be facilitated by the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (FTA), Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987 and Jan. 2, 1988, Canada-
United States, H.R. Doc. No. 216, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1988), reprinted in 27
I.L.M. 281 (1988). Harmonization of the competition laws of the two countries, how-
ever, is not even on the drawing board. New Personnel and New Programs Will Mark
Competition Enforcement Throughout World, 59 ANTrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. 80, 83
(1990). See alsoJoseph P. Griffen & Michael R. Calabrese, U.S. Antitrust Aspects of Com-
peting in Foreign Markets and the Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement, 14 CAN. U.S. L. J. 85, 91
(1988) (explaining that on account of the absence of agreement about international
discovery and about Canadian regulation of U.S. firms' acquisition of Canadian com-
panies, the FTA is unlikely to affect U.S. antitrust policy significantly).
43. The Director's success probably even exceeded the expectations of Warren
Grover. Not surprisingly, Grover served as counsel for the Director in NutraSweet.
See NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 2.
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determining whether NSC abused its dominant position through
"anticompetitive acts," and (5) determining whether such abuse less-
ened competition substantially in the "market." By examining Ameri-
can and EC case law, this Section will show that the Tribunal adhered
strictly to American and Community precedent on substantive law and
adopted the analytical framework used in monopolization cases in both
the U.S. and the EC.
A. The Product Market
The "product market" consists of that product or those products for
which a firm's market position is to be calculated. Along with the "geo-
graphic market," the product market helps to define the "market" in
which a firm's "control" (or "dominant position" or "monopoly
power") is to be evaluated. Subsection 1 of this Section will discuss the
product market issue before the Tribunal-whether sweeteners other
than aspartame should be included in the product market. Subsection 2
of this Section will set forth the U.S. and the EC approaches to deter-
mining the relevant product market. Subsection 3 will conclude that the
Tribunal's decision was identical to the decision that would have been
reached in America or Europe.
1. NutraSweet's Product Market
NSC argued that sweeteners other than aspartame should be included in
the product market. Under this view, NSC's position in the market
would have been small, thereby negating any possibility of market con-
trol. Conversely, the Director argued NSC had a ninety-five percent
share of Canadian4 4 sales of aspartame. The definition of product mar-
ket is a necessary step in finding "control" of a market. The Tribunal
concluded that substitutability between aspartame and other sweeteners
was limited and that, therefore, aspartame was the relevant product mar-
ket. As an initial matter, the Tribunal believed that the language of sub-
sections (1)(a) and (1)(c) of section 79 demanded inquiry into the
product market. These provisions respectively refer to substantial or
complete control of "a class or species of business" and substantial les-
sening of competition in a "market."' 45 The determination to be made
was primarily one of "substitutability"-"whether, and in what ways,
other sweeteners are good substitutes for aspartame" and, thus, whether
aspartame constituted a separate market or was "part of a broader class
of sweeteners.'"46
The Tribunal determined that aspartame differed from other sweet-
eners and constituted a distinct product market. This conclusion was
44. Assuming, of course, that the geographic market was to be limited to Canada.
45. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 11-12.
46. Id. at 12. The Tribunal stated that many factors could be of relevance in a
substitutability determination. In the instant action, the Tribunal relied upon "taste,
caloric content, other physical characteristics, safety concerns, price differences, and
users' responses to price changes." Id.
Cornell International Law Journal
supported by several factors. 4 7 First, "distinct physical and functional
characteristics" of the relevant sweeteners limited substitutability.
48
Aspartame's heat and storage instability tends to limit it to "wet" uses,
i.e., where it is dissolved when it reaches the consumer.49 Saccharin has
a bitter aftertaste and, along with cyclamates, is considered by some to
pose health risks. 50
Second, the Tribunal found the substitutability to be limited by reg-
ulations that restrict the use of high-intensity sweeteners, which, in
developed countries, must undergo lengthy and rigorous approval pro-
cedures. 5 1 For instance, cyclamates are currently banned in the U.S.,
and regulatory approvals entail such a delay that newer artificial sweet-
eners such as acesulfame-k, sucralose, and alitame will not soon com-
pete with aspartame in the diet soft drink market. 52 There was some
evidence, however, that, through blending, high-intensity sweeteners
could compete with aspartame.5 3
Third, the Tribunal found that limited substitutability existed
between caloric sweeteners, such as sugar and high-fructose corn syrup,
and high-intensity sweeteners, such as aspartame. Evidence illustrated
that diet products required intense sweeteners in order to be low in cal-
ories. 54 Similarly, there was no direct5 5 competition between caloric
sweeteners and aspartame because aspartame was not used to replace
sugar in caloric drinks even when less expensive on a sweetness-
equivalency basis.56 Additionally, the Tribunal found only weak evi-
dence of indirect competition, because the prices and marketing
schemes of diet and full-calorie products remained constant despite
changes in the price of aspartame relative to sugar.5 7 The Tribunal con-
cluded that demand for diet products was dictated primarily by lifestyle,
and that price differences in aspartame and sugar had almost no substi-
tutive effects.58
The Tribunal found most illuminating a comparison of the price of
aspartame in the American and Canadian markets. In the U.S., because
of NSC's use patent, price is limited only by the competition of other
sweeteners; in Canada, where NSC's use patent expired in 1987, "there
47. In its analysis, the Tribunal apparently found the arguments of the Director
persuasive. See Written Argument of the Applicant, supra note 31, at 108.
48. Id.
49. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 18-19.
50. Id. at 19-20.
51. Id. at 16.
52. Id. at 20-21.
53. Id. at 21.
54. Written Argument of the Applicant, supra note 31, at 109.
55. Direct competition exists when one sweetener is selected over another for a
particular use, while indirect competition is competition between products contain-
ing different sweeteners. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 22.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 23-24.
58. Id. at 27.
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is at least the possibility of competing aspartame suppliers." 5 9 The
price in the U.S. exceeds the Canadian price by more than fifty percent,
making it clear that the price of aspartame is not constrained by compe-
tition from other sweeteners already on the market.60
Thus, the Tribunal concluded that aspartame's only competition
from other sweeteners came from "very weak" evidence of indirect com-
petition with caloric sweeteners, and "some" direct competition with
other high-intensity sweeteners. 6 1 It therefore tentatively labelled the
relevant product market as "aspartame," noting, however, that "[i]t
really matters little . . . whether the relevant product is defined as
'aspartame' or 'high-intensity sweeteners' so long as the limited extent
to which other high-intensity sweeteners constrain aspartame prices is
kept in mind." 6 2
2. The United States and the European Community
a. The United States
In the U.S. "[iut is, of course, a basic principle in the law of monopoliza-
tion that the first step in a court's analysis must be a definition of the
relevant markets."6' 3 The principles for determining product market-
the "reasonable interchangeability" test-were spelled out in the semi-
nal Cellophane case.64 Interchangeability is determined by the "cross
elasticity of demand" between products, a measure of consumer willing-
ness to switch from purchasing one product to another when a change in
relative prices between the products occurs; a low cross-elasticity of
demand between two products indicates that they occupy different mar-
kets.6 5 A low value for cross-elasticity probably represents consumer
belief that the products are separate.6 6 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States6 7
modified this test and increased the reach of the Sherman Act by using
"submarkets" to define the product market.6 8 Well-defined submarkets
59. Id. at 29.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 30.
62. Id. The Tribunal also noted that, since aspartame was the only high-intensity
sweetener allowed as a food additive in Canada, the effect of foreign competition on
Canadian aspartame prices was indirect. Consequently, the critical question was the
degree of insulation in the Canadian market from the effects of competition else-
where, and this question was to be answered by examining the geographic market.
Id. at 30-31.
63. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 268 (2nd Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
64. United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (hold-
ing that though the defendant controlled the "cellophane" market, the interchangea-
bility of cellophane with other flexible wrapping materials sufficed to make it part of
the "flexible packaging material" market, in which defendant faced competition-
hence, there was no illegal monopoly).
65. See id. at 394-404.
66. Id.
67. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
68. Logically, if the product market is narrowed, the remaining firms' market
share and market power will increase. For example, a producer of 80% of the apples
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may exist for antitrust purposes within the broad boundaries of Cello-
phane's product market. The boundaries are determined "by examining
such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket
as a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and
uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices,
sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors."
6 9
In Borden, which exemplifies the Cellophane analysis, 70 the court had
to evaluate the F.T.C.'s decision not to include fresh lemons in the prod-
uct market of a processed lemon juice manufacturer. If the court con-
cluded that fresh lemons should be included in the product market, it
probably would not have found monopoly power because such a finding
would have dramatically reduced market share.7 1 The court agreed with
the F.T.C.'s determination that the two products were not reasonably
interchangeable, in view of low cross-elasticity and a host of other fac-
tors.72 The court found that the Cellophane analysis mandated these
considerations:
The Cellophane test . . . is not merely whether one product can be
substituted for the use of another product, but whether products may be
reasonably interchanged for the purposes for which they are produced
when prices, uses, and qualities of the products are considered.... If the
quality differences between two products are such that consumers would
not consider one product a viable substitute for another in making their
purchasing decisions, regardless of whether one product actually can be
substituted for the use of another, then these quality differences must be
considered in determining the reasonable interchangeability of the prod-
ucts in a competitive market.
73
In Borden, factors such as convenience, storage capabilities, taste,
the presence of chemical additives, and decorative uses illustrated the
differences between fresh lemons and processed lemon juice. The dif-
ferences buttressed the FTC's conclusion that "considering price, use
and quality, fresh lemons were not reasonably interchangeable with
processed lemon juice."'74
b. The European Community
The European Commission also relies heavily on the concepts of sub-
stitutability and price elasticity to define product markets:
in the U.S. will not have a monopoly in the "fruit" market if apples constitute 207% of
the fruit sold. But if the market, or the submarket, is defined as "apples," there is a
strong case for the presence of monopoly power.
69. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325 (footnote omitted). For an analysis of the pres-
ence of a submarket, see Cass Student Adv., Inc. v. National Educational Adv. Serv.,
Inc., 516 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986 (1975).
70. Borden, Inc. v. F.T.C., 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982).
71. Id. at 507. Borden's market share would have dropped from 95% to below 10
percent. Id.
72. Id. at 507-09.
73. Id. at 508.
74. Id. at 509.
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In the context of Article 86, the object of market delineation is to
define the area of commerce in which conditions of competition and the
market power of the dominant firm is to be assessed. The concept of
substitutability involves the question whether the market is drawn broadly
enough so as to include not only the products manufactured or marketed
by the allegedly dominant producer but also those which are in effective
competition with it. 7
5
The leading market-definition case before the Court of Justice of
the European Communities, United Brands, concluded that "particular
features" of bananas limit their interchangeability and thus insulate
them from the rigors of competition with other fruits.76 Characteristics
including "appearance, taste, softness, seedlessness, easy handling,
[and] a constant level of production" enabled bananas to "satisfy the
constant needs of an important section of the population consisting of
the very young, the old and the sick." 7 7 Small price variations in
response to seasonal competition confirmed that "a very large number
of consumers having a constant need for bananas are not noticeably or
even appreciably enticed away from" bananas by price fluctuations and
thus "the banana market is a market which is sufficiently distinct from
the other fresh fruit market."7 8
The EC also uses submarkets to define the relevant product market
if "sufficiently distinct in commercial reality to allow a supplier which
dominates it the power to exclude competition or control prices."'79
Narrow market definition will not preclude the application of Article
86.80
To find dominant market position it is not necessary to conclude
that there is a "complete absence of competition from other partially
75. Commission Decision 85/609 of 14 December 1985 Relating to a Proceeding
under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (ECS/AKZO), 1985 OJ. (L 374) 1, 17, [1986] 3
C.M.L.R. 273, 302.
76. Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 270, [1978] 1
C.M.L.R. 429, 481.
77. Id., 1978 E.C.R. at 273, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 483.
78. Id., 1978 E.C.R. at 273, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 483-84. See also Commission
Decision 88/501 of 26 July 1988 Relating to a Proceeding under Articles 85 and 86
of the EEC Treaty (Tetra Pak I (BTG License)), 1988 O.J. (L 272) 27, [1990] 4
C.M.L.R. 47; Commission Decision 88/518 of 18July 1988 Relating to a Proceeding
under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (Napier Brown v. British Sugar), 1988 O.J. (L
284) 41, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 196. Interestingly, Napier Brown addressed the inter-
changeability of caloric and high-intensity sweeteners and came to the same conclu-
sion as the NutraSweet Tribunal: "[i]ndustrially produced sugar substitutes such as
saccharin, cyclamates or aspartame only compete with natural sugar in limited uses
such as 'diet' products, and thus do not form part of the same relevant product mar-
ket as granulated sugar." Napier Brown, 1988 O.J. (L 284) at 50, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. at
215.
79. Commission Decision 87/500 of 29 July 1987 Relating to a Proceeding under
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (Brass Band Instruments, Ltd. v. Boosey & Hawkes),
1987 O.J. (L 286) 36, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 67.
80. Id.
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interchangeable products. '8 1 Thus, in Michelin, the retreading industry
did not weaken a dominant position in the new replacement tire industry
because Michelin was still able to "influence... the conditions in which
... competition may be exerted" and "to conduct itself to a large extent
without having to take account of that competition and without suffering
any adverse effects as a result of its attitude."8 2
3. Conclusions as to the Product Market
The Tribunal paralleled generations of U.S. and EC antitrust cases by
beginning its analysis with the question of market definition, and by ini-
tiating that inquiry with an investigation of the product market. Initially,
and perhaps inevitably, the Tribunal defined product market in terms of
substitutability, as do the U.S. and the EC. The Tribunal's reliance on
distinct physical characteristics as evidence of non-substitutability
resembles the analysis of the U.S. court in Borden and the EC court in
United Brands because the pivotal inquiry was whether "consumers would
... consider one product a viable substitute for another.., regardless of
whether one product actually can be substituted for the use of
another .... "83 The Tribunal also imitated the EC rationale when it
found that customer demand for aspartame (like customer demand for
bananas in United Brands) was related primarily to lifestyle. By disregard-
ing some limited competition from other products, the Tribunal again
mimicked the Court of the European Communities.
Consequently, by narrowing the product market from sweeteners to
aspartame alone, the Tribunal imitated recent American and European
case law. This case law has actively winnowed markets and submarkets,
consequently increasing the number of markets and submarkets and,
accordingly, the number of determinations that market power exists.
B. The Geographic Market
"Geographic market" defines the area in which a firm's "control" of a
"product market" is to be ascertained. Subsection 1 of this Section will
set forth the analysis of the issue before the Tribunal, whether the geo-
graphic market was worldwide, as contended by NSC, or limited to Can-
ada, as posited by the Director. Subsection 2 of this Section will present
U.S. and EC law defining the geographic market. Subsection 3 con-
cludes that the Tribunal's decision mirrors the U.S. and EC approaches.
81. Case 322/81, Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin N.V. v. Commission,
1983 E.C.R. 3461, 3508, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282, 325.
82. Id. See also Commission Decision 85/609 of 14 December 1985 Relating to a
proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (ECS/AKZO), 1985 O.J. (L 374) 1,
17, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 273, 302-03 (holding that even if other products that could be
substituted for organic peroxides in one of their minor uses were included in the
product market, the dominant position of AKZO was not weakened because "in the
more important usages organic peroxides are not subject to competition from other
chemicals").
83. Borden, Inc. v. F.T.C., 674 F.2d 498, 508 (6th Cir. 1982).
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1. NutraSweet
If the Tribunal determined that the geographic market consisted solely
of Canada, NSC's ninety-five percent share of the country's aspartame
sales would render a finding of market control likely. Conversely,
because NSC's worldwide share of aspartame sales was lower than its
Canadian share, defining the geographic market as worldwide would
limit the likelihood of establishment of market control. The Tribunal
concluded, however, that Canada was the appropriate geographic mar-
ket in which to analyze NSC's market control.
The Tribunal defined geographic market as "an area... sufficiently
insulated from price pressures emanating from other areas so that its
unique characteristics can result in its prices differing significantly for
any period of time from those in other areas." 84 Consequently, the Tri-
bunal accepted the Director's arguments that Canada was an appropri-
ate geographic market for aspartame because (1) the price of aspartame
around the world differed significantly from the price in Canada, and (2)
Canada was treated separately with respect to volume and price in multi-
nation contracts between NSC and Coca-Cola and Pepsi.
Addressing the first argument, the Tribunal agreed that the price
was a critical factor in determining whether the Canadian market should
be segregated from the rest of the world. 8 5 The price of aspartame dif-
fered significantly. Canadian prices were ten percent lower than prices
in Europe in 1987, six percent lower in 1988, and thirteen percent
higher in 1989.86
The Director's second argument was pivotal in negating NSC's con-
tention that the geographic market was worldwide. NSC maintained
that outside suppliers could quickly enter Canada, if NSC attempted to
raise prices, because transportation costs were low, the infrastructure
required for distribution was minimal, and no Canadian tariff or non-
tariff barriers existed.8 7 The Tribunal rejected this contention and
relied on the Director's argument that "supply contracts for aspartame
are country or region specific." 8 8 The Tribunal added that -[t]o the
extent equalization occurs, it is more likely to come from the negotiating
position of multinationals who account for a large fraction of
purchases." 89
The Tribunal nevertheless rejected the Director's third argument,
which asserted that Canada's regulatory scheme for admitting intense
sweeteners as food additives led to results different from the schemes
employed within the EC. While admitting that this factor was likely to
increase demand for aspartame, the Tribunal believed it was "not very
helpful in the delineation of geographic markets," as it was beyond the
84. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 32.
85. Id. at 34.
86. Id. at 35.
87. Id. at 32-33.
88. Id. at 33.
89. Id.
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scope of the critical inquiry.9 0 In conclusion, the Tribunal found:
Country-specific clauses in multi-country contracts along with these
average price differences indicate that market conditions in Canada,
which include the marketing practices of NSC, can and have produced
prices that differ significantly from those in other regions of competition.
In other words, it is reasonable to treat Canada as a separate geographic
market for the purposes of evaluating the effects of NSC's marketing
practices.9 1
2. The United States and the European Community
a. The United States
Under U.S. law, geographic market definition is crucial to determining
the relevant market.9 2 Sustained price differences evidence separate
geographic markets: "[a]s a general proposition, an area is a separate
geographic market if the change in the price of the product in that area
does not, within a relevant period of time, induce substantial changes in
the quantity of the product sold in other areas. '" 9 3 This approach is sel-
dom disputed in U.S. antitrust cases because it is generally agreed-
whether arrogantly or realistically-that the U.S., not the world, is the
proper geographic market for firms that market products nationwide in
America.9 4
b. The European Community
The EC uses the relevant geographic market to determine the "market"
in question. Geographic market is the area "where the conditions of
competition are sufficiently homogeneous for the effect of the economic
power of the undertaking concerned to be able to be evaluated." 9 5
90. Id. at 32.
91. Id. at 35. Ironically, the Tribunal apparently accepted the reasoning of Bruce
C. McDonald as set out in a paper written before he was counsel for NSC. He con-
cluded that the geographic market would be "the approximate area from which most
... customers come or can reasonably be attracted," a highly fact-specific inquiry
which in turn would depend on product price and perishability, transportation costs
and routes, and politically-imposed barriers such as customs duties, tariffs, quotas,
and tax rules. Id. McDonald, supra note 41, at 61-62.
92. General Business Sys. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 699 F.2d 965, 972 (9th Cir.
1983).
93. Statement of Federal Trade Commission Concerning Horizontal Mergers, reprinted in 42
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) S-12 (Special Supp. June 17, 1982). Professors
Areeda and Turner agree that "[r]elationships among prices and price movements in
different geographic areas are also relevant evidence in respect of whether a particu-
lar area is a separate geographic market. Separate markets are indicated for a given
product when its prices in separate and distinct geographic areas are relatively uncor-
related." 2 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, Ar=RrrusT LAW V 522 (1978).
94. See Cass Student Adv., Inc. v. National Educ. Adv. Serv., Inc., 516 F.2d 1092,
1096 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986 (1975); Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Prod.
Co., 479 F.2d 269, 286 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1027 (1973) ("Since no
attempt was made to narrow the geographic area, we assume the relevant market area
is the entire United States.").
95. Case 27/76, United Brands Co. v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 270, [19781
1 C.M.L.R. 429, 481.
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When defining the geographic market of the Michelin group, for
example, the Court ofJustice held that because most tire manufacturers
sold their products in various national markets through intermediary,
national subsidiaries, Michelin's geographic market in the Netherlands
was limited to the Netherlands. 96 Michelin vigorously protested, con-
tending that this was too narrow, especially since "the Commission itself
based its decision on factors concerning the Michelin group as a whole,
such as its technological lead and financial strength which.., relate to a
much wider market or even the world market."'9 7 Nonetheless, the fol-
lowing facts persuaded the Court: (1) Michelin's main competitors gen-
erally adapted to the specific conditions of individual countries and
carried on activities in the Netherlands through Dutch subsidiaries, and
(2) Netherlands dealers obtained their supplies solely from Netherlands
suppliers. 98
3. Conclusions as to the Geographic Market
The Tribunal paralleled U.S. and EC antitrust analysis by considering
geographic market definition as the second and final 99 component of
market definition. Though the Tribunal's reasoning as to geographic
market is perhaps more clear than that of its American and European
wellsprings, it draws its conclusions and analysis from these waters.
Price differences are clearly important in the U.S., while surely the large
price differences and Canada-specific contracts (like the Netherlands-
specific contracts in Michelin) would render Canada "an area where the
objective conditions of competition applying to the product in question
[would] be the same for all traders."' 00 Additionally, both the U.S. and
the EC (as exemplified by Michelin) tend to define the geographic market
by a particular country's borders and tend not to define the entire world
as the proper geographic market. (Of course, the European Community
may define the geographic market as the entire Common Market, but
the underlying principle is the same.) Both EC and U.S. courts would
find Canada to be the proper geographic market in which to evaluate
NSC's market power.
C. Control
"Market control" (or a "dominant position" or "market power" or
"monopoly power") is a prerequisite to liability under section 79, Arti-
cle 86, or section 2 of the Sherman Act. Subsection 1 of this Section will
lay out the issue before the Tribunal-whether, given its delineation of
the product market (aspartame) and the geographic market (Canada),
96. Case 322/81, Nederlandsche-Banden Industrie Michelin N.V. v. Commission,
1983 E.C.R. 3461, 3502, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282, 320-21.
97. Id., 1983 E.C.R. at 3501-02, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. at 320.
98. Id.
99. The "requirement" of a relevant time period was implied in NutraSweet but
not discussed.
100. United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. at 274, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 484-85.
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NSC controlled "a class or species of business" for the purposes of sec-
tion 79(1)(a). Subsection 2 will lay out the case law of the U.S. and the
EC regarding control. Subsection 3 will conclude that the Tribunal fol-
lowed this precedent.
1. NutraSweet
If, as the Director maintained, "control" existed, the Tribunal would
consider NSC's alleged anticompetitive acts. Conversely, if NSC con-
vinced the Tribunal that control was lacking, the "abuse of dominance"
portion of the case would necessarily be dismissed. The Tribunal con-
cluded that NSC possessed control because of NSC's large market share
and the numerous barriers to entry present in the market.
The Tribunal examined the express wording of the provision to
determine the requirements for finding abuse of a dominant position. It
started with the terms "control" and "class or species of business" in
section 79(1)(a). Turning first to the meaning of "substantially or com-
pletely control," the Tribunal rejected the Director's proposed "diction-
ary definition." 10 1 The Tribunal agreed with NSC's argument that
"control" meant market power which, in turn, meant "the ability to set
prices over competitive levels for a considerable period."' 0 2
Although the Tribunal adopted this meaning, it expressed reserva-
tions about the interpretation because it is difficult to apply. The deter-
mining factors, such as entry barriers and market share, vary from case
to case.10 3 Additionally, factors relevant to determining market power
would also be relevant to determining anticompetitive impact. Conse-
quently, the Tribunal was reluctant to adopt a mode of analysis that
would tend to collapse other subsections of section 79.104
The Director submitted that the "class or species of business" men-
tioned in section 79(1)(a) should be interpreted in the "commercial"
rather than in the economic sense of a product market and that under a
commercial interpretation, the relevant market was aspartame.10 5
101. "To exercise restraint or direction upon the free action of; to dominate, com-
mand." Written Argument of the Applicant, supra note 31, at 17.
102. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 46-47.
103. Id. at 47.
104. Id. Such problems are "pervasive in competition law because the relevant
factors in the different statutory elements are rarely distinct and it is impossible not
to draw on common factors whenever required." Id. at 47-48.
105. In this argument the Director relied on the definition of "class or species of
business" gleaned from Eddy Match Co. v. Queen, (1953) 18 C.R. 357; 109 C.C.C. 1;
20 C.P.R. 107 (Que. C.A.). In that case, the defendant manufactured only wooden
matches, and the "class or species of business" was limited to wooden matches and
did not include other types of lighting devices. The Tribunal distinguished Eddy
Match, however, because that case was decided by a court, not a specialized tribunal,
and was evaluated under a criminal statute, not a civil one. "It would run contrary to
the spirit of the [Competition Act] for the Tribunal to eschew other relevant factors
... possible substitutes .. ." in defining a "class or species of business." NutraSweet,
No. CT-89/2 at 55.
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The Tribunal, however, consistent with its holding that "control"
meant market power, agreed with NSC that "class or species of busi-
ness" was synonymous with product market, since market power "makes
sense" only within a product market.' 0 6 The Tribunal noted, however,
that the distinction was of little import since the relevant product market
in Canada was the market for aspartame. 0 7
Nevertheless, the Director maintained that even if control is
equated with market power, NSC's large market share' 0 8 and the pres-
ence of entry barriers' 0 9 demonstrated that NSC had control. 10
In response, NSC offered several arguments, all of which were
rejected by the Tribunal. First, NSC argued that declining prices and
increased output since 1987 indicated that NSC did not have market
power. The Tribunal maintained that NSC was losing market power
because it had lost its exclusive-use patent. 1 1
Second, NSC argued that its effective market power was diminished
because its largest customers, Coca-Cola and Pepsi, could protect their
interests. The Tribunal, however, found that, even though NSC had to
evaluate the response of these customers before it made major moves,
the reverse was also true, for Coca-Cola and Pepsi had to evaluate the
response of NSC before they made major moves, especially with NSC's
U.S. patent in effect until 1992.112
Third, NSC maintained that competitors and potential competitors
denied NSC market power. This submission was dealt with by reference
to the Tribunal's discussion of the significant "barriers to entry" that
exist in the manufacture of aspartame.' 3
106. The Director believed that the product market should be considered in sub-
section 79(l)(c), in reference to the substantial lessening of competition in "a mar-
ket." The Tribunal, however, believed that the logic of the entire section was better
followed if the product market was "precisely" defined in subsection 79(1)(a) rather
than partially dealt with in both subsection (a) and (c). Id. at 55-56.
107. Id. at 53.
108. The Director argued that a market share greater than 90%o must raise a strong
inference of market power. Written Argument of the Applicant, supra note 31, at 20.
109. The Director suggested several such barriers:
(a) process patent barriers associated with producing aspartame; (b) signifi-
cant sunk costs required to produce aspartame efficiently; (c) [NSC's] con-
tractual practices, which preclude marginal entry and therefore increase the
scale of and the costs associated with initial entry; (d) [NSC's] marketing
practices which require competitors to engage in similar, expensive market-
ing in order to compete; and (e) delays associated with regulatory approval
and subsequent consumer acceptance of any new intense sweetener. Id. at
21.
110. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 48.
111. Id. at49.
112. Id. at 49-51. The Tribunal also rejected NSC's argument that either Coke or
Pepsi could set up a rival aspartame producer, citing unrecoverable start-up costs,
economies of scale, and the fact that the company that did not set up such a plant
would derive benefits from downward price pressures, caused by the significant
worldwide excess capacity the plant would cause. Id. at 49-50.
113. Id. at 52.
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The Tribunal had already concluded, however, that significant entry
barriers confronted potential aspartame producers. Although a com-
pany could produce aspartame without a patent, and even though hold-
ing a patent did not guarantee that technology would be of low cost, the
Tribunal found that "proprietary technology protected by trade secrecy
is an impediment to entry."' 14 Moreover, the Tribunal rejected NSC's
claim that numerous "fine-chemical firms"' 1 5 were potential market
entrants or re-entrants. Finding a source of phenylalanine"1 6 and the
increased cost of producing aspartame in general-purpose plants, most
often used by fine-chemical firms, would restrict the possible entry of
fine-chemical firms. 17 NSC's size, experience, and market position cre-
ated other entry barriers. The Tribunal noted that it takes about two
years to construct an aspartame plant and several months to overcome
production problems. 118 Entry conditions would remain especially diffi-
cult until 1992, when the U.S. patent would expire and seventy-five per-
cent of the world market consequently opened to competition. 119
There are also significant economies of scale associated with plants that
have capacities of approximately a third of the world output. Thus, a
firm wanting per-ton costs comparable to NSC would have to achieve a
very large market share. Additionally, construction of a large plant
would entail large, risky, unrecoverable capital outlays. Much of the
investment in a dedicated aspartame plant is "sunk" because the plant is
of greatly diminished value for other uses.120 Finally, significant
aspartame production experience would be required for a firm to meet
the price of an experienced producer such as NSC. 12 1
Having rejected NSC's arguments, the Tribunal found that, given a
ninety-five percent market share and the presence of substantial entry
barriers, the Director had demonstrated market power. In addition, the
Tribunal agreed with the Director 12 2 that the control demonstrated was
so great "that the boundaries of substantial need not be explored." 123
2. The United States and the European Community
a. The United States
In the United States, the product and geographic markets define the
contours of the market, "the array of firms that currently produces or
114. Id. at 37.
115. "Fine chemical firms" are those firms without plants "dedicated" to
aspartame production.
116. Aspartame is produced by combining aspartic acid, a substance that is widely
available and used in several industrial processes, and phenylalanine, which is used
almost exclusively for aspartame production. NutraSweet, No. CT-89 at 35-36.
117. Id. at 38-39.
118. Id. at 43.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 43-44.
121. Id. at 44.
122. Written Argument of the Applicant, supra note 31, at 22.
123. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 52.
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potentially will produce products that are sufficiently close substitutes to
take business away from any firm or group of firms that attempts to exer-
cise market power."' 12 4 The Court, in Cellophane, defined market power
as "the ability to control prices or exclude competition." 1 25 More spe-
cifically, market power enables a firm to raise prices without losing busi-
ness.' 26 Market power is not determined by size alone:
[a]lthough power may be derived from size... the two are not identi-
cal .... A firm that has lawfully acquired a monopoly position is not
barred from taking advantage of scale economies by constructing, for
example, a large and efficient factory. These benefits are a consequence
of size and not an exercise of power over the market. 127
U.S. courts look closely at market share and have held that a
monopoly "ordinarily may be inferred from the predominant share of the
market."1 28 A large market share is not always determinative, 129 how-
ever, and some courts have held that "no single factor" controls such
determinations because "'market share is just the starting point for
assessing market power.' ,13 In some cases, a high market share will
support a finding of monopoly power,18 1 but in other cases, when mar-
kets have low entry barriers or when a firm lacks control, it will not.'8 2
Entry barriers often compliment raw market share in determining
monopoly position in U.S. case law. "[A] firm with a high market share
may be able to exert market power in the short run, but '[s]ubstantial
market power can persist only if there are significant and continuing bar-
riers to entry.' 133 In Oahu Gas, for example, evidence of both a high,
though declining, market share and significant barriers to entry during
the relevant time periods made reasonable a jury finding of market
power.'3 4
In Borden, entry barriers from several sources were found to compli-
ment Borden's ninety-percent market share in the processed lemon
juice market, which led to a conclusion that monopoly power was pres-
ent. These included: (1) successful product differentiation, wherein
124. Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1806 (1990).
125. United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1950).
126. Pitofsky, supra note 124, at 1806.
127. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2nd Cir. 1979).
128. United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (emphasis added).
See also McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1505 (11 th Cir. 1988)
("best test" for market power is "relative size," i.e., market share); Borden, Inc. v.
F.T.C., 674 F.2d 498, 511 (6th Cir. 1982).
129. Borden, 674 F.2d at 511.
130. Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 366 (9th Cir.
1988) (quoting Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 925 (9th
Cir. 1980)).
131. Oahu Gas, 838 F.2d at 367 (quoting Hunt-Wesson, 627 F.2d at 925).
132. Id. at 366.
133. Id. (quoting 2 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANITRUST LAW 505
(1978)).
134. Oahu Gas, 838 F.2d at 366-67.
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ReaLemon became almost synonymous with reconstituted lemon juice;
(2) the fact that ReaLemon was extensively advertised and was the most
significant (and only nationwide) advertiser throughout the relevant
time period; and (3) Borden's strong resource advantage over its com-
petitors, which allowed it to finance promotions, a public relations pro-
gram, and tie-ins with other Borden products through cross-advertising
and cross-couponing.' 3 5
Similarly, in Alcoa, Judge Hand concluded a ninety percent market
share by itself was large enough to constitute a monopoly.1 3 6 In Grinnel,
"87% of the accredited central station service business le[ft] no doubt
that the congeries of these defendants ha[d] monopoly power."' 3 7
b. The European Community
In the European Community, the process of determining market power
is much the same; the ability to exercise market power is termed a "dom-
inant position." Interpreting Article 86, the Court ofJustice observed in
United Brands:
The dominant position referred to in this Article relates to a position
of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to pre-
vent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by
giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of
its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers. 13 8
As interpreted by the European Court of Justice, a dominant position
"derives from a combination of several factors which, taken separately,
are not necessarily determinative."' 1 9 As in the United States, very
large market shares absent "exceptional circumstances" evidence a
dominant position. 140 But EC courts, like U.S. courts, look beyond mar-
ket share to other indicators, primarily "entry barriers," to determine
the existence of market power.
For instance, in United Brands, even though a forty to forty-five per-
cent share during the relevant time period was not enough to decide
conclusively that UBC controlled the market, 14 ' the court did find con-
trol because significant entry barriers were present.' 42
135. Borden, 674 F.2d at 511-12.
136. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 425-26 (2nd Cir.
1945).
137. United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
138. Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 277, [1978] 1
C.M.L.R. 429, 486-87.
139. Id. at 487.
140. Case 85/76, Hoffinann-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 521,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211, 275. An enterprise holding a large market share for some
time is "in a position of strength which makes it an unavoidable trading partner and
... that freedom of action... is the special feature of a dominant position." Id.
141. United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. at 282, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 490.
142. Id., 1978 E.C.R. at 284, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 490-91 (barriers included large
capital investments required for the creation and running of banana plantations,
effects of fruit diseases and bad weather, the system of distribution for very perisha-
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Similarly, the Court in Hoffmann-La Roche examined entry barriers to
conclude that, in addition to market shares between forty-seven percent
and one hundred percent for various vitamins, "all the constituent ele-
ments of a dominant position were present."1 4 3 Although Roche's pat-
ents for the manufacture of vitamins had expired, the firm still enjoyed
technological advantages over its competitors, including a highly devel-
oped customer information and assistance service. Moreover, the firm
had a very extensive and highly specialized sales network. 14 4
Furthermore, in the EC, as in Canada, a court may infer dominant
position when a firm's customers are large and powerful.' 4 5
3. Conclusions as to Control
After defining NSC's product and geographic markets, the Tribunal, as
would be done in the U.S. or the EC, evaluated NSC's market power.
The Tribunal used traditional American and European methods with a
slight semantic twist. Both the EC and the U.S. consider market share
(unless overwhelming in itself) in conjunction with many other factors in
determining whether monopoly power or dominant position exist.
Although the Tribunal used the same factors as the EC and U.S., such as
size, experience, market position, patent portfolios and the economies
of scale, it considered them when interpreting the phrase "entry barri-
ers" rather than when examining the effects of a large market share.
American or European courts would have concluded that NSC pos-
sessed market power, even if those jurisdictions would not have made a
finding based on NSC's huge market share alone.
ble product, economies of scale, expenses of an adequate commercial network,
advertising campaigns, and unrecoverable costs if a risky venture attempt fails).
143. Hoffmann-La Roche, 1979 E.C.R. at 531, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 283.
144. Id., 1979 E.C.R. at 521-22, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 275-76. Other EC cases
illustrating this concept are manifold. See, e.g., Commission Decision 89/22 of 5
December 1988 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (Iberian
Trading UK, Ltd. v. BPB Industries, plc), 1989 OJ. (L 10) 50, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 464,
490 (finding that a market share of 96% to 98%o, reinforced by barriers such as "sub-
stantial economies" of scale and "very extensive technical and financial resources,"
created a dominant position); Commission Decision 85/609 of 14 December 1985
Relating to a Proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (ECS/AKZO), 1985 OJ.
(L 374) 1, 18, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 273, 304 (finding dominant position in presence of
market share of 50%o and significant barriers to entry, such as firm's commercial and
marketing advantages over its rivals and its broader range of products offered); Com-
mission Decision 88/138 of 22 December 1987 Relating to a Proceeding under Arti-
cle 86 of the EEC Treaty (Eurofix Bauco v. Hilti), 1987 OJ. (L 65) 19, [1989] 4
C.M.L.R. 677 (finding dominant position in large market share, strong research and
development position, well organized distribution system, and innovative products
protected by patents); Case 322/81, Nederlandsche-Bander Industrie Michelin NV.
v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, 3503, 3510, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 320, 322, 327
(finding that market share of 57-65% and entry barriers such as a broad product
range and strong research and development position pointed to the existence of a
dominant position).
145. See, e.g., Case 322/81, Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin N.V. v.
Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, 3512, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282, 328.
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D. Practice of Anticompetitive Acts
Once market control has been established, the Tribunal must find
"practice" of "anti-competitive acts" pursuant to section 79(1)(b) for
the "abuse of dominance" inquiry to go forward. Subsection 1 of Part
II.D will explore the Tribunal's decision to read the "practice" require-
ment expansively and will examine the Tribunal's reasoning in its inves-
tigation of the five types of acts the Director alleged that NSC
committed: (a) abuses of governmental reporting requirements, (b)
contractual exclusion of potential competitors, (c) use of contract terms
associated with exclusivity, (d) selling below cost, and (e) using a United
States patent to foreclose competition in Canada. Subsection 2 will
examine U.S. and EC case law relevant to use of contract terms associ-
ated with exclusivity and use of a United States patent to foreclose com-
petition in Canada. Subsection 3 will conclude that U.S. and EC
precedent supported the Tribunal's conclusion that violations had
occurred.
1. NutraSweet
"Abuse of dominance" under section 79(1)(b) includes two elements: a
"practice" and "anticompetitive acts."' 146
Because the Act does not define "practice," commentators specu-
lated as to whether it meant " 'almost anything done more than once in
a short time' " or " 'repetitive acts or an ongoing pricing scheme for a
period of time.' "147 The Tribunal held that a practice exists where
more than an "isolated act or acts" is present. Additionally, the Tribu-
nal concluded that individual anticompetitive acts taken together may
constitute a "practice."' 148
The Director claimed that NSC engaged in eight "anticompetitive
acts." The Tribunal treated the acts in five groups: abuse of govern-
mental reporting requirements, contractual exclusion of potential com-
petitors, use of contract terms associated with exclusivity, selling below
cost, and use of the U.S. patent to foreclose competition. 149 Even
though only one of the acts mentioned by the Director was listed in sec-
146. Competition Act § 79(I)(b).
147. Stanbury, supra note 6, at 33 (quoting Warren M. H. Grover, Use and Abuse of
Market Power: Monopolies, an Overview, in COMPETITION LAW IN CANADA, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE INSIGHT CONFERENCE (Toronto, Feb. 17, 1986), Tab 5, at 4); Arthur B. James,
Abuse of a Dominant Position: A Discussion ofjoint Dominance and Anti Competitive Acts, in
COMPETITION LAW OF CANADA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSIGHT CONFERENCE, Toronto,
Feb. 17, 1986, at 5.
148. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 59. The Director submitted that the interpreta-
tion of practice adopted in R. v. William E. Coutts Co. Ltd., [1968] 1 O.R. 549 (C.A.)
should control. In that case, which was a resale price maintenance case and was
therefore brought under a different section of the Competition Act, two individual
instances of selling greeting cards constituted a "practice." The court held in Coutts
that "the word [practice] is used in the section in the sense that it denotes a distinc-
tion from an isolated act or acts." NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 58; Written Argument
of the Applicant, supra note 31, at 23.
149. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 59.
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tion 78, the Director maintained that all the challenged acts were
anticompetitive because they "parallel[ed] the concerns addressed by
the enumerated examples."' 5 0 Moreover, the Tribunal held that sec-
tion 78's "list of anticompetitive acts is clearly not meant to be
exhaustive .... "151
The Director defined anticompetitive acts as acts of a firm in a dom-
inant position that cause a purchase decision to be made for reasons
other than competition on the merits. 15 2 The Tribunal agreed, but
framed the proposition slightly differently. It noted that all the enumer-
ated acts in section 78 had "an intended negative effect on a competitor
that is predatory, exclusionary or disciplinary."1 5 3 Thus, the Tribunal
held that "an anticompetitive act must be performed for a purpose, and
evidence of this purpose is a necessary ingredient."' 15 4
Since purpose can be difficult to prove, even under a civil standard
of proof, 1 5 5 the Tribunal accepted the Director's argument that purpose
could be established by "evidence of subjective intent (through verbal
or written statements of personnel of [NSC]) or a consideration of the
act itself (the premise that a corporation can be taken to intend the nec-
essary and foreseeable consequences of its acts)."1 5 6 The Tribunal fur-
ther conceded that this will probably be the normal method of
establishing purpose. 157
150. Written Argument of the Applicant, supra note 31, at 26.
151. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 57.
152. Written Argument of the Applicant, supra note 31, at 27. The merits are
"legitimate use of skill, foresight, natural and economic forces and the law."
153. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 57.
154. Id. "This recognizes that in many cases the behavior itself could be consid-
ered pro-competitive or neutral and that it is the purpose that makes it objectiona-
ble." DUNLOP ET AL., supra note 9, at 200.
155. Corporate intent presents especially difficult problems of proof. Internal
memoranda and communications of employees, expressing exclusionary purposes as
part of instructions to implement particular actions, are difficult to separate from
careless expressions intended to motivate employees. McDonald, supra note 41, at
68.
156. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 60; see Written Argument of Applicant, supra note
31, at 28-34; Reply of the Applicant, The Director of Investigation and Research,
Public Version at 19-20, Director of Investigation and Research v. NutraSweet Co.,
No. CT-89/2, (Comp. Trib. Oct. 4, 1990).
157. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 60. The Director gathered support for this prop-
osition from U.S. law. Written Argument of the Applicant, supra note 31, at 29-30.
But see A. A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th
Cir. 1989) (holding that intent is irrelevant in predatory pricing cases). In Rose Acre
Farms, Judge Easterbrook stated, in dictum,
[i]ntent does not help to separate competition from attempted monopoliza-
tion and invites juries to penalize hard competition. It also complicates litiga-
tion. Lawyers rummage through business records seeking to discover tidbits
that will sound impressive (or aggressive) when read to a jury. Traipsing
through the warehouses of business in search of misleading evidence both
increases the costs of litigation and reduces the accuracy of decisions. Strip-
ping intent away brings the real economic questions to the fore at the same
time as it streamlines antitrust litigation. Although reference to intent in prin-
cipe could help disambiguate bits of economic evidence in rare cases, the cost
(in money and error) of searching for these rare cases is too high-in large
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a. Abuse of Governmental Reporting Requirements
The Director alleged that NSC abused governmental reporting require-
ments with two acts: (1) NSC reported a loss on its Canadian tax returns
for 1986-88 despite the expectation that NSC would profit from its
strong market position, and (2) the absence of a clear explanation for
NSC's method of valuing imported aspartame on customs declaration
forms.1 5 8 Because the Director did not attempt to demonstrate an
anticompetitive purpose behind these alleged abuses, the Tribunal
found the accusations to be without merit.' 5 9
b. Contractual Exclusion of Potential Competitors
The Director then submitted that NSC had committed an anticompeti-
tive act by using contract terms to exclude Ajinomotol 60 from selling
aspartame in Canada through 1995.161 The Tribunal rejected NSC's
contention that the contract was part of an overall scheme to enhance
efficiency, finding instead that "the two leading producers, each with
formidable, if somewhat different, strengths have in effect agreed not to
compete."' 62 Nevertheless, the Tribunal held that the contract was not
an anticompetitive act because section 78 requires "that the competitor
of the dominant firm is a target not a fellow actor." 63 The Tribunal did
not, however, immunize all "horizontal arrangements" from the reach
of sections 78 and 79. It simply found that adequate justification for
challenging the NSC/Ajinomoto arrangement as an anticompetitive act
was lacking.16
c. Contract Terms Associated with Exclusivity
The Director alleged that NSC engaged in a practice of anticompetitive
acts by using three types of contract terms: (1) exclusive-supply clauses,
(2) trademark and logo display allowances, and (3) meet-or-release and
most-favored-nation clauses.1 6 5 Prior to addressing the anticompetitive
issue, the Tribunal found the "practice" requirement was satisfied for
each of the acts. Exclusive-supply clauses and trademark-display
allowances appeared in nearly every one of NSC's supply contracts;
meet-or-release clauses were present in both the Pepsi and Coca-Cola
contracts, and thus covered "a large volume of sales over several
measure because the evidence offered to prove intent will be even more
ambiguous than the economic data it seeks to illuminate.
Id.
158. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 60-61.
159. Id. at 61.
160. Until recently, NSC's use patents, covering most of the world, had foreclosed
Ajinomoto from functioning as an independent supplier. Id. at 62.
161. Id. at 61-62.
162. Id. at 63.
163. Id. at 64.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 64-66.
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years." 16 6
i. Exclusive-Supply Clauses
Under exclusive-supply clauses the purchaser promises to buy all of its
aspartame from NSC; under exclusive-use clauses the purchaser is
required to use NSC aspartame "as the sole or primary sweetener in
some or all of the [purchaser's] product."' 167 .As the Tribunal stated,
"[t]he two are slightly repetitive since NutraSweet brand aspartame can-
not normally be purchased from anyone other than NSC."' 6 8
The Tribunal observed that although exclusivity was not among the
anticompetitive acts enumerated in section 78, it was "in this case wholly
consistent with them."'169 The Tribunal concluded that by giving dis-
counts to purchasers who would display the "NutraSweet" logo and
advertise jointly with NSC, 170 the firm essentially required buyers to use
166. Id. at 66.
167. Id. at 64.
168. Id. at 65.
169. Id. at 67. Section 77 reads in part:
(1) (a) any practice whereby a supplier of a product, as a condition of supply-
ing the product to a customer, requires the customer to
(i) deal only or primarily in products supplied by or designated by
the supplier or the supplier's nominee, or
(ii) refrain from dealing in a specified class or kind of product except
by the supplier or the nominee, and
(b) any practice whereby a supplier of a product induces a customer to
meet a condition set out in subparagraph (a)(i) or (ii) by offering to sup-
ply the product to the customer on more favorable terms or conditions if
the customer agrees to meet the condition set out in either of those sub-
paragraphs; ....
(2) Where, on application by the Director, the Tribunal finds that the exclu-
sive dealing or tied selling, because it is engaged in by a major supplier of a
product in a market or because it is widespread in a market, is likely to
(a) impede entry into or expansion of a firm in the market,
(b) impede introduction of a product into or expansion of sales of a
product in the market, or
(c) have any other exclusionary effect in the market,
with the result that competition is or is likely to be lessened substantially, the
Tribunal may make an order directed to all or any of the suppliers against
whom an order is sought prohibiting them from continuing to engage in
exclusive dealing or tied selling and continuing any other requirement that,
in its opinion, is necessary to overcome the effects thereof in the market or to
restore or stimulate competition in the market.
Competition Act § 77. As illustrated by this section, the Competition Act has a sepa-
rate provision dealing with "exclusive dealing," which does not require the perpetra-
tor to possess a dominant position. Predictably, the Director brought his application
under the aegis of this section, and the Tribunal did find that NSC had committed
violations of section 77(1)(b) (though not section 77(1)(a)). NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2
at 98. What is interesting is that, knowing this section to exist and that NSC's behav-
ior fit most neatly under its provisions, the Director maintained and the Tribunal
agreed that a violation of section 79 was also present due to NSC's market position.
Such "dual liability" illustrates the breadth with which section 79 may be interpreted.
170. The tactic of identifying and promoting an ingredient is known as the
"branded ingredient strategy." See generally Eben Shapiro, NutraSweet's Bitter Fight,
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NSC aspartame exclusively. 1 7 1
NSC argued, unsuccessfully, that exclusivity is common in the econ-
omy, that it is often necessary to distribute a product efficiently, and that
it could "clearly" be the result of competitive markets.1 72 NSC's inter-
nal documents painted a different picture, however, showing that (1)
NSC believed that the strategy was necessary to prevent prices from fall-
ing to the level of marginal costs of production, a common occurrence
in the "chemicals as commodities" market, and (2) NSC endeavored to
"capture and to keep as much of the market as possible" as part of a
"sole supplier strategy."' 73 As a result of these considerations, and in
light of the fact that the strategy was implemented when customer
choice was limited by the Canadian use patent, the Tribunal found that
the "purpose" element was established. "[T]he strategy has been pur-
sued for the purpose of excluding future or existing competition and
not because it is required for efficient distribution or use of the
product."1 74
ii. Display Allowances
In return for prominently displaying the NutraSweet name and logo on
packaging or advertising in print or on television, NSC provided a sub-
stantial discount, calculated on the amount of NutraSweet purchased
and not on the number of times the trademark was displayed. 175 The
Tribunal found four problems with this scheme. First, though custom-
ers were free not to display the NutraSweet logo, they were "virtually
compelled" to do so "given that the price inducement [was] of the order
of 40% when both logo display and promotion allowances [were] con-
sidered."' 76 Second, the amounts of the logo display allowances were
not based on the value of the exposure to NSC, or on the value to NSC
of exposure on one label as opposed to another, or on the number and
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1989, § 3, at 4; Nancy Ryan, End of Patent to Alter Market for
NutraSweet, Cm. TRIB., July 15, 1991, at C1.
171. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 67.
[A]s long as NSC was, through its patent monopoly, the sole supplier of
aspartame, the distinction between inducing the use of the name and logo
through price reductions and requiring it as a condition of supply was largely
a semantic one since NSC could arrange its prices so that customers had little
effective choice. The branded ingredient strategy becomes a matter of exclu-
sivity wherever the use patent expires and customers have at least the legal
opportunity of buying from other suppliers.
Id. Though not identical, the "branded ingredient strategy" employed by NSC finds
a parallel in Borden, a U.S. case where Borden attempted to merge the identity of its
brand of processed lemon juice with processed lemon juice in general. Borden, Inc.
v. F.T.C., 674 F.2d 498, 512 (6th Cir. 1982).
172. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 68.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 68-69. Later on, the Tribunal felt that purpose infected not only the
agreements requiring exclusive supply, but also "all the contract terms related to it."
Id. at 73. This established the purpose element for both the "display allowance" and
the meet-or-release and most-favored-nation clauses.
175. Id. at 65.
176. Id. at 69.
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quality of the advertising impressions.17 7 Third, the allowances put cus-
tomers in an all-or-nothing dilemma because if a customer did not want
to use the display or commit to buying aspartame exclusively from NSC
for a product line, the customer had to purchase the entire line of
aspartame from a competing producer because the non-discount NSC
price was too high. Moreover, the competing producer had to be large
enough to supply aspartame for that entire line. Fourth, NutraSweet
used the strategy to promote exclusivity, not its product. For example,
under their contracts, Coca-Cola and Pepsi received the allowance both
for large returnable bottles that did not display the trademark promi-
nently, as well as for fountain drinks, which did not display any logo.
178
Thus the Tribunal concluded that "the logo display and promotion
allowances [were] essentially inducements to exclusivity." 179
iii. Meet-or-Release Clauses and Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
Meet-or-release clauses gave NSC the option of meeting a competitor's
bid or releasing the customer to buy from the rival supplier. Although
the clauses could be seen as mitigating the effects of long-term exclusive
contracts, the Tribunal did not see them that way. Though Coca-Cola
and Pepsi had requested the clauses, the Tribunal held that "by making
exclusivity more acceptable to customers [they] serve[d] as an induce-
ment for customers to enter into exclusive arrangements."' 8 0 In addi-
tion, the clauses discouraged competitors from submitting bids since
NSC would be given the opportunity to meet any price they submitted.
Consequently, the clauses posed another entry barrier to competitors.
Most-favored-nation clauses ensure "that the price to a particular
customer is the lowest price paid by any customer for an equivalent vol-
ume of" a product.' 8 ' Only a firm with a large market share can offer
such clauses because only such a firm will be supplying the customer's
competitors.' 8 2 The Director suggested that such clauses induced
exclusivity because they assured customers that they would not be
treated worse than their competitors. Taking a different tack, the Tribu-
nal held that the clauses did not mitigate the objectionability of the
exclusive-supply clauses because large buyers would be unlikely "to
exert pressure on their suppliers and thus enhance competition" if the
rewards for their efforts would flow to their competitors as well.18 3
177. The Director distinguished NSC's "Trade Mark Display Allowance," which
was priced on a per-kilogram basis, from the purchase of advertising space on its
customers' packaging, which normally would be evaluated in terms of "advertising
impressions." Written Argument of the Applicant, supra note 31, at 57.
178. NutraSweet, No. GT-89/2 at 69-70.
179. Id. at 71.
180. Id. at 71-72.
181. Id. at 66.
182. Id. at 72.
183. Id.
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d. Selling Below Cost: Relevant Cost Standard
The Director also alleged the NSC violated section 78(i) by selling arti-
cles at a price lower than the "acquisition cost for the purpose of disci-
plining or eliminating a competitor." 18 4 The Tribunal, however, noted
that the term "acquisition cost" was not easily applied to manufacturing
situations, and suggested that:
Parliament intended this paragraph to be applied to distribution, i.e.,
to situations where articles are purchased for resale. Since NSC buys
product from Ajinomoto, there is a purchase and resale by NSC. [Under
section 78(i)] acquisition cost is restricted to the cost of the articles and
not to the cost of distributing them ... ; that is, only the price paid to
Ajinomoto, and not the marketing and distribution costs of the Canadian
operations, conforms to acquisition cost.185
Thus, NSC's manufacturing and other costs were not within the sphere
of application of section 78(i).
The Tribunal next turned to the possibility that NutraSweet was
engaging in anticompetitive acts outside the scope of section 78(i). The
point was extensively briefed, and the Tribunal accepted that "anticom-
petitive act" in section 79 encompassed "predatory pricing."' 8 6
In its limited analysis, the Tribunal considered that in NSC's case
"marginal CoSt" 1 8 7 was an appropriate standard for determining preda-
tory pricing. Because of the difficulty in determining marginal cost,
"average variable cost"' 8 8 was used as an appropriate proxy.189 Despite
the "strong commercial motive" to sell below cost, in order to impede
entry and thereby protect the American market that will open to compe-
tition after 1992, the Director presented little evidence that NSC had in
fact priced below cost. The Tribunal, therefore, reached no conclusion
on this point.190
e. Use of United States Patents to Foreclose Competition
The Director also argued that NSC had abused its U.S. patent in three
anticompetitive ways. The Tribunal quickly dismissed the first two alle-
gations but was persuaded by the third. First, the Director argued that
NSC had used the U.S. patent to extort exclusive-supply contracts from
Coca-Cola and Pepsi. But the Tribunal, having dealt with this action in
184. Competition Act § 78(i).
185. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 74.
186. Id. at 75. The Tribunal's treatment of the issue, however, was rather cursory
and uninformative. See id.
187. "mhe added cost of producing an additional unit." Id.
188. "[The average cost per unit of all production taking into account only the
cost components that vary with output." Id.
189. Id. The Tribunal also used "average total cost per unit of production" for the
periods in question when NSC was operating at plant capacity. Id. at 76.
190. Id. at 75-78. As the Director had sought no remedy concerning prices other
than that they be forbidden from falling below "acquisition cost," which the Tribunal
found irrelevant to the case, a specific finding on selling below cost was not required.
Id. at 78.
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other contexts, did not believe that it constituted a separate anticompe-
titive act.191 Second, the Director argued that NSC used profits from its
United States monopoly to finance below-cost pricing in Canada. The
Tribunal concluded that this was part of the allegation of pricing below
cost. In any event, the Tribunal believed that the Director's evidence
did not support the claim. 192
Finally, the Director successfully alleged that NSC had lured one
customer away from its competitor through incentives in the U.S. mar-
ket.19 3 For three reasons, the Tribunal believed that NSC used "the
United States patent ... to exclude competition, and in a most heavy-
handed fashion." First, since competitors could not know what incen-
tives NSC would offer, they could not match the offer "short of provid-
ing customers with a blank check." Second, the large financial losses
that NSC stood to absorb indicated that NSC was willing "to price with-
out regard to its cost in order to prevent the expansion of HSC." Third,
it was "a form of dumping in that NSC can in effect export its product at
a price below that charged in the United States, without any risk to its
domestic price which is protected by its exclusive patent rights."'194 The
Tribunal thus found an anticompetitive act in the use of a monopoly
position of a dominant firm in one market to achieve a competitive
advantage in another market.' 9 5
2. The United States and the European Community
a. The United States
In the United States, exclusive-supply contracts are considered anticom-
petitive only when made by a firm with dominant market power; "[s]uch
conduct is illegal when taken by a monopolist because it tends to destroy
competition, although in the hands of a smaller market participant it
might be considered harmless."' 9 6 The question usually asked in such
cases is whether the actions go "beyond the needs of ordinary business
dealings [or] beyond the ambit of ordinary business skill." 19 7 Promises
by the buyer to buy exclusively from the seller, to buy exclusively from
191. Id.
192. Id. at 78-79.
193. NSC persuaded an American firm, Nutri/System, to convince its Canadian co-
packer, U.F.L. Foods, Inc., to switch from buying aspartame from Tosoh to buying
from NSC. It did so by offering Nutri/System rebates on aspartame it bought in the
United States. Id. at 79.
194. Id. at 79-80.
195. Id. at 80. The Tribunal here undermined its earlier determination that "a
class or species of business" in section 79(1)(a) and "a market" in section 79(1)(c) are
equivalent and mean "product market." See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying
text. See Anderson & Khosla, supra note 12, at 52 (arguing that since section 79(1)(c)
speaks of "a market" and not "the market," a "class or species of business" may be
defined differently in sections 79(1)(a) and 79(1)(c), permitting application of abuse
provisions to situations where a dominant position in one market is used to lessen
competition in a different market).
196. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2nd Cir. 1979).
197. Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 230 (Ist Cir. 1983).
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the seller for a specified time, or to buy specified amounts are all ana-
lyzed under a "rule of reason," not under per se rules. Every contract
restricts buyers to a certain extent. Thus, determination of the illegality
of an exclusive contract hinges on the extent of the foreclosure and on
the business justifications of the contracting parties. 198
In Cass,19 9 the National Educational Advertising Services, Inc.
(NEAS) possessed a seventy-five percent share of national advertising in
college newspapers, a ninety-eight percent share of the placing of such
advertising, and access through its contractual relationships to eighty-
seven percent of the collegiate population. NEAS secured its dominant
position through contracts with college newspapers, which provided
that NEAS would be the paper's sole representative in securing national
advertising. The District Court found the agreements violated section 2
of the Sherman Act. 20 0 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit adopted the
opinion of the District Court.20 1
The combination of NEAS's dominant market share and NEAS's
exclusive contracts created the liability. Regardless of the propriety of
exclusive representation contracts in other advertising markets, "'in the
context of proof of monopoly power, these contracts [long-term, indefinite
duration, exclusive representation arrangements] are anticompetitive
and constitute an unfair method of competition . . . as
monopolization.' "202
In International Salt,20 3 the defendant argued that the anticompeti-
tive effects of its contracts were mitigated by meet-or-release clauses, a
position the Supreme Court rejected. Though the clauses afforded cus-
tomers "some protection," they were objectionable for two reasons.
First, competitors were dissuaded from making offers because they knew
the dominant supplier needed only to match them to retain the business.
Second, the competitors knew that their prices, sensitive commercial
information, would be disclosed to their chief rival, and thus were dis-
couraged from making bids. The provisions were held to be abusive
because "[t]he appellant had at all times a priority on the business at
equal prices." '20 4
Most-favored-nation contract terms were also present in Interna-
tional Salt, a case in which a customer was entitled to general price
198. Id. at 236-39.
199. Cass Student Adv., Inc. v. National Educ. Adv. Serv., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 520
(N.D. Ill.), aft'd, 516 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1976).
200. Id. at 524.
201. Cass Student Adv., Inc. v. National Educ. Adv. Serv., Inc., 516 F.2d 1092 (7th
Cir. 1976).
202. Cass, 407 F. Supp. at 522 (quoting L. G. Balfour Co. v. F.T.C., 442 F.2d 1, 14
(7th Cir. 1971)). See also Multiflex, Inc. v. Samuel Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980, 990-91
(5th Cir. 1983) (firm in dominant market position violated monopolization provision
of the Sherman Act, section 2, by entering into exclusive contracts with customers
even when its illegal attempt to retain its monopoly failed).
203. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
204. Id. at 397.
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deductions if it purchased only the seller's products.20 5 The defendant
contended that these terms mitigated the unreasonableness of its behav-
ior, but the Court remained unconvinced that most-favored-nation
clauses relieved its anticompetitive behavior. The Court stated that the
provision was of no "legal significance" because the customer received
only the right to buy the product at the seller's going price in return for
purchasing only the seller's product. 20 6
The use of a dominant market position in one market to obtain an
improved position, though not necessarily a dominant one, in another
market, is also anathema in the United States. In Kerasotes,20 7 a case
uncannily similar to Grzffith, 208 a firm's use of its dominant market posi-
tion in other areas to secure first-run films was held to violate antitrust
laws. The theme of Kerasotes was that "[p]roducts that may be inferior
should not be allowed to prosper in a particular market as a result of [a]
producer's exploitation of its monopoly position in a second mar-
ket."' 20 9 This is especially true when coercion is present.2 10 Addition-
ally, the court noted that it is of no import that a dominant position is
not achieved in the target market, since the "antitrust laws prohibit not
just the possession of monopoly power but also attempts to restrain
trade and impede competition." 2 11
b. The European Community
The EC analyzes exclusive contracts similarly. An undertaking in a dom-
inant position violates Article 86 by entering into exclusive-supply or
requirements contracts, even when the buyer requests the terms. 212
The Court in Hoffmann-La Roche explained that exclusive contracts "are
incompatible with the objective of undistorted competition within the
Common Market" because "they are not based on an economic transac-
tion which justified this burden or benefit but are designed to deprive
the purchaser of or restrict his possible choices of sources of supply and
205. Id. at 396.
206. Id. at 397.
207. Kerasotes Mich. Theatres, Inc. v. National Amusements, Inc., 854 F.2d 135,
(6th Cir. 1988).
208. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107-08 (1948). "It is indeed, 'unrea-
sonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market.' The antitrust
laws are as much violated by the prevention of competition as by its destruction. It
follows afortiori that the use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to fore-
close competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is
unlawful." Id.
209. Kerasoles, 854 F.2d at 138.
210. Id.
211. Id. See also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2nd
Cir. 1979) (firm's "leveraging" of monopoly power in one market to gain competitive
advantage in another violates section 2 of the Sherman Act, even absent intent to
monopolize, and even though competition in the "leveraged" market is merely dis-
torted, not destroyed).
212. Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 539,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211, 289.
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to deny other producers access to the market."'2 13
In the EC, it is also an abuse of a dominant position to grant "fidel-
ity rebates," which are "discounts conditional on the customer's
obtaining all or most of its requirements-whether the quantity of its
purchases be large or small-from the undertaking in a dominant posi-
tion." 2 14 In Hoffinann-La Roche, clauses in supply contracts provided
that the buyer would get a rebate or discount if it received all or nearly
all of its vitamin requirements from La Roche.2 15 The rebates were not
volume rebates, for they did not depend on how many vitamins the pur-
chaser bought, but on whether all the customer's needs, no matter how
large, were met by La Roche.2 1 6 The court declared:
The fidelity rebate, unlike quantity rebates exclusively linked with the
volume of purchases from the producer concerned, is designed through
the grant of a financial advantage to prevent customers from obtaining
their supplies from competing producers. Furthermore, the effect of
fidelity rebates is to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions
with other trading parties in that two purchasers pay a different price for
the same quantity of the same product depending on whether they obtain
their supplies exclusively from the undertaking in a dominant position or
have several sources of supply.2 17
The contracts were additionally anticompetitive since the rebate
was granted on the purchases of all different types of vitamins. Thus, if
a purchaser bought one type of vitamin from another supplier, it would
lose its rebate across the whole spectrum of vitamins. 218
In Michelin, the Court found illegal another "fidelity rebate" that
offered discounts to customers who met specified, annual sales targets.
These sales targets were based upon the customer's sales figures during
the previous year, and thus were not volume rebates, which would not
have been an abuse.2 19 The effect of the discount at the end of the year
was to put "increasing pressure on the buyer to reach the purchase fig-
ure needed to obtain the discount or to avoid suffering the expected loss
for the entire period." 2 20 Of course, this also pressured competing
dealers, who wished to sell tires near the end of the discount period, to
take into account the absolute value of the discount that might be fore-
gone.22 1 The Court concluded:
Such a situation is calculated to prevent dealers from being able to
select freely at any time in the light of the market situation the most
favorable of the offers made by the various competitors and to change
213. Id. at 290.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 288-89.
216. Id. at 291.
217. Id. at 290.
218. Id. at 295.
219. Case 322/81, Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin N.V. v. Commission,
1983 E.C.R. 3461, 3515, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282, 331.
220. Id., 1983 E.C.R. at 3517, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. at 332.
221. Id., 1983 E.C.R. at 3517-18, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. at 333.
470
1992 Canadian Monopolies Law
supplier without suffering any appreciable economic disadvantage. It
thus limits the dealers' choice of supplier and makes access to the market
more difficult for competitors. Neither the wish to sell more nor the wish
to spread production more evenly can justify such a restriction of the cus-
tomer's freedom of choice and independence. The position of depen-
dence in which dealers find themselves and which is created by the
discount system in question, is not therefore based on any countervailing
advantage which may be economically justified.22 2
EC case law, like U.S. law, finds meet-or-release clauses objectiona-
ble. The applicant in Hoffmann-La Roche argued that the restrictive effect
on competition of its contracts was mollified by the "English" (meet-or-
release) clauses. 2 23 The Court held that even though the clauses helped
"to remedy some of the unfair consequences" 2 24 of the contracts, they
were objectionable because (1) they allowed Roche itself to "permit
competition" or not simply by adjusting its prices, and (2) they gave
Roche valuable information about the market and about its
competitors. 22 5
3. Conclusions as to Anticompetitive Acts
The Tribunal's analysis and conclusions resembled antitrust case law in
the U.S. and the EC. First, the Tribunal removed whatever force the
word "practice" possessed in section 79(1)(b). By considering anything
more than one instance of a single type of act to be a practice, the Tribu-
nal brought the section closer to American law, which broadly requires a
"monopoly or an attempt to monopolize," and EC law, which encom-
passes any "abuse." Second, the Tribunal also interpreted section 78's
list of anticompetitive acts to be a nonexhaustive one, an approach taken
under American common law and also adopted by the EC. Third, all of
the anticompetitive acts in which NSC was found to have engaged,
including use of exclusive-supply clauses, display allowances, meet-or-
release clauses, most-favored-nation clauses, and a U.S. patent to fore-
222. Id., 1983 E.C.R. at 3518, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. at 333. Examples of the invalidity
of fidelity rebates under EC law are numerous. See also Commission Decision 88/518
of 18 July 1988 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (Napier
Brown v. British Sugar), 1988 OJ. (L 284) 41, 50, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 196, 224-25
(group commitment bonuses, designed to restrict purchasers' choice of supply and to
deny competitors' access to market, held to be analogous to fidelity rebates and
therefore abuse of dominant position); Commission Decision 89/22 of 5 December
1988 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (BPB Industries
plc), 1988 O.J. (L 10) 50, 65, 69, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 464, 492,498 (payments to firms
undertaking to purchase plasterboard exclusively from supplier constituted abuse of
dominant position).
223. Case 85/76, Hoffinann-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 544,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211, 293.
224. Id.
225. Id., 1979 E.C.R. at 545-46, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 294. See also Commission
Decision 85/609 of 14 December 1985 Relating to a Proceeding uhder Article 86 of
the EEC Treaty (ECS/AKZO), 1985 O.J. (L 374) 1, 22, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 273, 310
(systematically obtaining details of price offers made by other suppliers and pricingjust below the lowest quote was exclusionary).
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close competition in Canada, have extensive precedent in the U.S. and
the EC.
E. Preventing or Lessening Competition Substantially in a Market
According to the statutory scheme, after finding control of the market
under subsection 79(1)(a) and a practice of anticompetitive acts under
subsection 79(1)(b), the Tribunal still had to find a substantial lessening
of competition pursuant to subsection 79(l)(c) before it could issue an
order against NSC. Subsection 1 of this Section will lay out the Tribu-
nal's analysis. Subsection 2 will present similar U.S. and EC law. Sub-
section 3 will conclude that the Tribunal adhered to U.S. and EC
precedents in making its determination.
1. NutraSweet
The Tribunal completed its analysis by considering section 79(1) (c), the
final element that must be present for the Tribunal to issue an order in
an abuse-of-dominance case. Section 79(l)(c) requires that "the prac-
tice has had, is having or is likely to have the effect of preventing or
lessening competition substantially in a market." 226 The market in
question, as previously determined, was "the sale and purchase of
aspartame in Canada." 2 2 7 The factors used to determine the presence
of substantial lessening of competition resembled the ones evaluated to
determine the presence of market power.228 Thus, in essence, the ques-
tion under section 79(l)(c) was whether the anticompetitive acts
strengthened or prolonged market power.2 29 More narrowly with
respect to the two anticompetitive practices found to have occurred, 230
the Tribunal framed the question as "the degree to which these
anticompetitive acts add to the entry barriers into the Canadian market
and.., into the industry. 23 1
Since the Act does not define substantial lessening of competition,
it was necessary for the Tribunal to analyze the term. 23 2 Yet the Tribu-
nal's admission that factors relevant to section 79(l)(c) resemble the fac-
tors used to determine market power under section 79(l)(b) appears to
confirm the arguments of critics who find this part of the Act
superfluous:
Once the Tribunal has found "dominance," which by definition
posits a market completely or substantially devoid of competition, and a
practice of anticompetitive acts, it is unclear what additional relevance
that "substantial lessening of competition" factor could have to the Tri-
226. Critics of this subsection wonder "why an act which has been defined as
anticompetitive should be condoned by the government." Martin & Martin, supra
note 9, at 66.
227. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 80.
228. Id. at 81.
229. Id.
230. See supra notes 149-95 and accompanying text.
231. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 81.
232. KAISER, supra note 4, § 9A.03, at 10.
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bunal's determination as to the existence of abusive conduct. 23 3
The analysis of the Tribunal squared with the stated objectives of the
Director, who professed not to be concerned about the competitive suc-
cess of Tosoh, or about any other player in the aspartame market, as
long as "each . . . competitor is able to compete on a level playing
field." 23 4 To that end, the Director sought "to ensure that every com-
petitor or potential competitor ... is able to enter the aspartame market
without having to overcome artificial entry barriers which have been
erected by [NSC]." '23 5
The Director submitted that the absence of other competitors and
the limited ability of HSC to increase its market share proved that the
terms of NSC's supply contracts were significant entry barriers that pre-
vented "toe-hold entry." 25 6 In response, NSC presented several argu-
ments, none of which succeeded.
Initially, NSC attributed HSC's inability to achieve more than a min-
ute market share to "growing pains." Though the Tribunal accepted
this as a possible, partial explanation, it considered the strength of such
defense "diluted by the fact that, as its Canadian patent expired, NSC
entered into exclusive contracts running, for the most part, to the end of
1988."'2s7 Thus, the Tribunal linked HSC's weak market position to
NSC's marketing practices. 23 8 Moreover, without even addressing
NSC's other defenses, the Tribunal concluded:
the exclusivity in NSC's contracts, which includes both the clauses reflect-
ing agreement to deal only or primarily in NutraSweet brand aspartame
and the financial inducements to do so, impedes "toehold entry" into the
market and inhibits the expansion of other firms in the market. Since
exclusive use and supply clauses appear in virtually all of NSC's 1989 con-
tracts, and thus cover over 90 percent of the Canadian market for
aspartame, it is clear that during the currency of those contracts there is
little room for entry by a new supplier.23 9
NSC also argued that the terms of its contracts were not restrictive.
In response, the Tribunal noted that it had already determined that
meet-or-release and most-favored-nation clauses exacerbated rather
than mitigated the anticompetitive nature of the contracts. 240 Though
the one-year contracts theoretically did not tie up the market after their
233. Grover & Kwinter, supra note 41, at 297. See also DUNLOP ET AL., supra note 9,
at 200 (presence of "purpose" along with a dominant position might be enough to
find that the practice "is likely to have the effect of preventing or lessening competi-
tion substantially in a market").
234. Reply of the Applicant, Director of Investigation and Research, Public Ver-
sion at 2, Director of Investigation and Research v. NutraSweet Co., No. CT-89/2
(Comp. Trib. Oct. 4, 1990).
235. Id. at 9.
236. NutraSweet, No. CT-89/2 at 81.
237. Id. at 82.
238. Id. at 83.
239. Id. at 84.
240. Id. at 83-84.
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expiration, the contracts created significant differences between NSC
and its competitors after that time. For example, NSC customers would
incur financial costs in removing the trademark logo from packaging and
would risk that consumers would react adversely. 24 1 Further, if a firm
sought another source of supply, in addition to NSC, it would have to
separate its product lines to retain NSC rebates, thus entailing higher
inventory costs. 242
NSC maintained that it needed exclusivity for several reasons. First,
it claimed that exclusivity lowered customer costs.243 The Tribunal held
that claims of lower costs could be made for any industry and that, since
no claim could be made that the aspartame industry differed from other
industries, such arguments carried no weight. 244 Second, NSC claimed
that exclusivity protected it from free riders, since NSC bore all the costs
involved in obtaining regulatory approval. 245 To this argument, the
Tribunal succinctly replied that NSC was entitled to no more protection
than its patents afforded.246
It is interesting that the Tribunal dealt only obliquely with section
79(4), the defense of superior competitive performance, which states:
[i]n determining, for the purposes of subsection (1), whether a practice
has had, is having or is likely to have the effect of preventing or lessening
competition in a market, the Tribunal shall consider whether the practice
is a result of superior competitive performance.
24 7
This section is part of an innovation of the new Act-the idea of effi-
ciency trade-offs. 248 By means of efficiency trade-offs, Canadian compe-
tition authorities may recognize that monopolies are not inherently bad
and could be "necessary to compete in world markets. ' '24 9 This would
explain the inconsistency inherent in such a provision. As one commen-
241. Id. at 85-87.
242. Id. at 88.
243. Customer costs would be lower because NSC could thus make investments to
meet customers' needs, and because "per-unit inventory costs are less when inven-
tories are centrally managed (by NSC)." Id. at 89-90.
244. Id. at 90.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 90-91.
247. Competition Act, § 79(4). When Bill C-91 originally was introduced, this sec-
tion stated:
no order shall be made ... where the Tribunal finds that competition has been, is
being or is likely to be prevented or lessened substantially in a market as a
result of the superior competitive performance of the person or persons
against whom the order is sought.
Thus, what originally was a defense was changed into a mere factor for consideration
in an apparent attempt to strengthen the Bill. Stanbury, supra note 6, at 33.
248. KAISER, supra note 4, § 14.09[4], at 72-74. Section 68 also contains an "effi-
ciency gains" provision. The Tribunal will not prohibit a merger if the efficiency
gains that accompany it will be greater than the harmful effects upon competition. Id.
at 73.
249. Id. See also David Owen, Graspingfor Scale, FIN. TiMEs, Feb. 16, 1989, § I, at 28
(arguing that removal of trade barriers forces Canadian industries to restructure in
order to acquire the "critical mass" necessary for international competition).
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tator pointed out, "any suggestion of superior competitive performance
would seem inferentially rebutted by proof of an anticompetitive prac-
tice, particularly as such proof appears, under the Act, to be predicated
on a showing of predatory or anticompetitive intent. ' 250 Nonetheless,
firms could use their dominant position and the consequent weakness of
their rivals as evidence of superior competitive performance and eco-
nomic efficiency. 2 51 Indeed, that was an original pillar of NSC's
defense.2 52 The Tribunal may have been persuaded by critics of section
79(4), or perhaps it realized that the section's intent was to preserve
domestic industry in the face of foreign competition. This was not at
issue, however, and the Tribunal put almost no store in section 79(4)
and never addressed it directly. 253
2. The United States and the European Community
a. The United States
Under the laws of the United States, "[tihe goal of the antitrust
laws .... unlike that of business tort or unfair competition laws, is to
safeguard general competitive conditions, rather than to protect specific
competitors. ' 254 Thus, "actual injury to competition" must be present
in the market where monopoly power exists. 255 Illegitimately acquired
monopoly power is always subject to censure in the U.S. but legitimately
acquired monopoly power is illegal only if used to "extend" or "main-
tain" market control. A negative effect on the market is required for
liability to ensue. 25 6
250. Grover & Kwinter, supra note 41, at 297. See also DUNLOP ET AL., supra note 9,
at 200-01; McDonald, supra note 41, at 65. See also DUNLOP ET AL., supra note 9, at
290 (pointing out that "practices" will rarely be the result of superior competitive
performance; presumably, the purpose of the provision is to avoid divestiture of posi-
lions resulting from superior competitive performance that are efficient).
251. Stanbury, supra note 6, at 33.
252. Canadian Competition Tribunal Hears First Abuse of Dominant Position Case, 58 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 104, 104 (Jan. 18, 1990).
253. The Tribunal's brief treatment of the section may come as a surprise to both
sides, for prior to the case Director Wetston stated "[tihere will be some important
factual assessments that will be required in balancing the anticompetitive behavior
that we're alleging with the superior competitive performance which NutraSweet is
obviously going to rely on." New Personnel and New Programs Will Mark Competition
Enforcement Throughout World, 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 80, 85-86 (Jan.
18, 1990) (quoting Director Wetston).
Relying on sections 77(2), 79(1), and 77(2), the Tribunal issued an order prohibit-
ing NSC from enforcing agreements that (1) required NSC's Canadian customers to
purchase or to use NSC aspartame exclusively, (2) provided financial inducements to
purchase NSC aspartame by means of trademark display, advertising, or similar
allowances, (3) inserted meet-or-release terms, or (4) involved most-favored-nation
clauses, unless such clauses were included as well in NSC's supply contracts with
competitors of NSC's customers.
254. Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 370 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).
255. General Business Sys. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 699 F.2d 965, 972 (9th Cir.
1983).
256. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2nd Cir. 1979).
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The United States recognizes defenses related to market injury and
purpose. If the monopoly power is acquired through "superior skill,
foresight, and industry" 25 7 or "superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident,"12 5 8 it is not within the ambit of the Sherman Act's
prohibitions.
b. The European Community
The Hoffmann-La Roche court described the EC's "abuse of dominance"
provision thus:
The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behavior of
an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the
structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the under-
taking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and which,
through recourse of methods different from those which condition nor-
mal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of
commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the
degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that
competition.2 59
Because the presence of the dominant firm has already damaged compe-
tition in the market, any anticompetitive act by that firm is an abuse, if it
affects trade between Member States.2 60 The EC, like the U.S., does not
penalize superior competitive performance or dominance per se, but
rather only in the presence of anticompetitive acts. Thus, a finding that
a firm possesses a dominant position "is not in itself a recrimination but
simply means that, irrespective of the reasons for which it has such a
dominant position, the undertaking concerned has a special responsibil-
ity not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition
on the Common Market." '2 6 1
3. Conclusions as to Substantial Lessening of Competition
An effect on the market is required even when both monopoly power
and anticompetitive acts are present. Regardless of the strength of mar-
ket position and evil intent, a fortuitous absence of actual injury will pre-
vent liability. Indeed, one might initially wonder why an "effects" test is
necessary at all; when both a dominant position and anticompetitive
acts already exist, finding the presence of these effects is rarely an ardu-
ous task. It is hard to imagine a situation where such conditions are
257. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2nd Cir. 1945).
258. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
259. Case 85/76, Hoffiann-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 541,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211, 290-91.
260. EEC TREAr, supra note 25, art. 86.
261. Case 322/81, Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin N.V. v. Commission,
1983 E.C.R. 3461, 3511, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282, 325. See also Commission Decision
88/501 of 26July 1988 Relating to a Proceeding under Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty (Tetra Pak I (BTG License)), 1988 OJ. (L 272) 27, 41, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 47,
73; Commission Decision 88/138 of 22 December 1987 Relating to a Proceeding
under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (Eurofix Bauco v. Hilti), 1987 O.J. (L 65) 19,
[1989] C.M.L.R. 677.
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present and a court could not find extension or maintenance of market
control or effects on the trade among Member States. Thus, though
"effects" tests are present in the EC and the U.S., they carry little
weight. Similarly, in Canada the effects test was given no bite, and the
Tribunal in the NutraSweet case did not specifically consider the substan-
tial lessening of competition. Market power and entry barriers proved
control, and, in the presence of anticompetitive acts, a substantial les-
sening of competition is proven by the presence of market power and
entry barriers.
The U.S. and EC both have a "superior competitive performance"
provision that provides analogous defenses nearer the threshold of
inquiry. In the U.S., monopoly power acquired by "superior skill, indus-
try and foresight" is not illegal, 2 62 and a firm is not challenged for acts
that do not utilize that power to extend or maintain market control.2 63
The EC neither prohibits dominant positions per se nor censures conduct
by a firm that does not employ "methods different from those which
condition normal competition. ' '2 ° 4 The EC and the U.S. thus treat the
defense of superior competitive performance as logically apparent. The
Tribunal, by avoiding mention of superior competitive performance
considerations found in section 79(4), has followed their lead.
I. The Procedural and Analytical Framework Adopted by the Tribunal
Section II of this Note illustrates how the Tribunal adhered to U.S. and
EC precedent in its substantive law determinations. Section III argues
that by following this path, the Tribunal altered the structure of section
79, and in its place left machinery for antitrust analysis almost identical
to the European and American models.
The Director prefaced his brief with the proposition that the Tribu-
nal should consider as persuasive the case law of the U.S. and the EC in
its NutraSweet decision.2 65 Such reliance, he argued, was both necessary
and proper.26 6 It was necessary because the Competition Act's abuse
provision was a civil construction with different wording and standard of
proof than the old criminal provision and because of the near absence of
Canadian monopoly case law.2 6 7 It was proper because, although the
wording of section 79 was "substantially" different from the American
and European provisions, it "deal[t] with similar problems in a similar
commercial context and in light of similar legal concepts. '2 68
The Tribunal followed the course laid out by the Director and used
reasoning drawn from American and European case law to decide the
262. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
263. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979).
264. Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 541,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211, 290.
265. Written Argument of the Applicant, supra note 31, at 2.
266. Id,
267. id.
268. Id.
Cornell International Law Journal
case. In doing so, it replaced what had been a novel and unique "Cana-
dian" approach to problems of monopoly power with an organ of Amer-
ican and European workings. Although outwardly the section retains its
novel structure, it now functions similarly to section 2 of the Sherman
Act or Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome.
The result is not difficult to explain. In drafting section 79, Parlia-
ment provided a novel framework, but few interstitial rules. For
instance, Parliament left terms like "control" and "market" undefined;
procedures and methods for establishing the presence of a "market" or
"control" were absent as well. Thus, the Tribunal not only looked to
American and European case law for precedent in substantive matters,
such as what constitutes an anticompetitive act, but also for analytical
and procedural assistance. Though not so instructed by Parliament, the
Tribunal followed the method and order of analysis traditional in Amer-
ican and European cases: (1) define the product market, (2) define the
geographic market, (3) with the "market" established, determine the
presence of "control," and (4) determine whether that market control
was abused through anticompetitive acts that affected competition in the
market.
Since the language of section 79 did not square with the American
and European approaches, the Tribunal changed the structure of the
abuse provision. Section 79, as drafted by Parliament, reads:
79. (1) Where, on application by the Director, the Tribunal finds
that
(a) one or more persons substantially or completely control,
throughout Canada or any area thereof, a class or species of business,
(b) that person or those persons have engaged in or are engaging in
a practice of anticompetitive acts, and
(c) the practice has had, is having or is likely to have the effect of
preventing or lessening competition substantially in a market,
the Tribunal may make an order prohibiting all or any of those per-
sons from engaging in that practice. 269
In interpreting the statute, however, the Tribunal (1) equated "class or
species of business" with "market," 270 (2) equated "control" with an
ability to exercise "market power," 2 71 (3) minimized section 79(1)(b)'s
requirement of a "practice" of anticompetitive acts by requiring only
one type of act to be performed twice or two types of acts to be per-
formed once each, 2 72 (4) made section 78's list of anticompetitive acts
non-exhaustive, 2 73 (5) used the factors to be considered in 79(l)(c) to
determine substantial lessening of competition also as factors needed to
determine an ability to exercise "control" of "a class or species of busi-
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ness" in section 79(1)(a), 274 (6) diminished the importance of section
79(l)(c)'s requirement of a substantial lessening of competition, 2 75 and
(7) practically ignored section 79(4)'s superior competitive performance
considerations. After this retooling by the Tribunal, section 79 would
more appropriately read:
79. (1) Where, on application by the Director, the Tribunal finds
that
(a) one or more persons possess market power in a product market
in Canada or any area thereof; and
(b) that person or those persons have engaged in or are engaging in
anticompetitive acts of the type illustrated in section 78, with effects upon
competition in the product market arising from those acts
the Tribunal may make an order prohibiting all or any of those per-
sons from engaging in that practice.
In effect, section 79, although it appears to be a new approach to "abuse
of dominance" problems, was read as if it were a provision almost iden-
tical to section 2 of the Sherman Act and Article 86 of the Treaty of
Rome. 276
The Tribunal's conversion of section 79 does not render the new
provision ineffective. It addresses the problems associated with the
Combines Investigation Act2 7 7 including: (1) the onerous criminal bur-
den of proof, (2) the reluctance of judges to impose criminal sanctions,
(3) lack of economic background or a healthy body of case law to guide
judges, (4) lack of guidelines for businesspersons, (5) failure to focus on
anticompetitive behavior by a firm in a dominant position, rather than a
dominant position itself, and (6) lack of a provision to deal with domi-
nant positions that were the product merely of superior competitive
performance. 278
The civil nature of the proceeding, with the consequent civil burden
of proof, apparently eased the task of the Director and made the Tribu-
nal more willing to impose liability.2 79 Although the Tribunal could
have started a new and creative course for Canadian laws, by adopting a
large body of U.S. and EC case law, the Tribunal nevertheless provided
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guidance for judges and businesspeople. 28 0 The Tribunal could have
changed the focus of inquiry to the anticompetitive behavior if it had
adhered strictly to the wording of section 79 or if it had adopted U.S.
and EC law as its own, as all three jurisdictions do not prohibit a domi-
nant position per se. Arguably, the Tribunal's conspicuous avoidance of
the superior competitive performance section renders unclear whether
the Tribunal provides a component to deal with superior competitive
performance.
Consequently, the new Canadian section is an effective one. Its
potency may even have been enhanced by adopting U.S. and EC prece-
dent, because businesspeople can predict how courts will interpret sec-
tion 79. The Tribunal may simply have accepted the inevitable.
Canada, after all, now has an effective antimonopoly provision, which
had not been the case after Parliament's first attempt at creating one.
The U.S., and the EC to a lesser extent, have engaged in active antitrust
enforcement for a long time and now possess a system time-worn and
honed. Perhaps it has been honed to the shape that represents the most
workable method for monopoly enforcement. Perhaps not. But clearly,
the course set for Canadian "abuse of dominance" law, which is to fol-
low in the footsteps of its elder peers, is not one that will point out the
flaws of the U.S. and EC frameworks any time soon.
Conclusion
As the first case decided under section 79, NutraSweet was critical in
determining the path Canada would take in its "abuse of dominance"
actions. The Tribunal, presented with an opportunity to forge a dis-
tinctly Canadian approach to problems of market power, chose instead
to adopt both the case law and the analytical framework of the U.S. and
EC. Though this choice implicitly and rather dramatically changed the
structure of section 79, the Tribunal cannot really be criticized for its
action. Canada now has an effective "abuse of dominance" provision,
one that perhaps takes an inevitable shape.
Richard P. Lewis
280. As a practical matter, of course, Canadian lawyers should become familiar
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